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The Constitutionality of Warrantless Electronic
Surveillance of Suspected Foreign Threats to
the National Security of the United States
MICHAEL AVERY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September
11, the National Security Agency ("NSA") launched a secret program to
engage in electronic surveillance, without prior judicial authorization, of
communications between persons in other countries and persons inside
the United States (the "Terrorist Surveillance Program" or "TSP").1
* Professor, Suffolk Law School, Boston, Massachusetts. I am grateful to the deans of
Suffolk Law School for a summer-writing stipend that made this article possible and to my
research assistant, Suzanne Manning, for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of the final
draft of this article. It is important to disclose that I am one of the lawyers representing the
plaintiffs in Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17,
2006), which is currently pending before the Honorable Vaughn R. Walker in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. I do so on behalf of the National Lawyers Guild. As
such I have a strong bias in favor of the argument that the government's actions with respect to
warrantless electronic surveillance have been in violation of federal statutes and of the
Constitution. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that this article is heavily dependent,
including for some of its language, on the briefing that we have done in that case. The plaintiffs'
briefs were prepared by a team of lawyers, including in addition to me, Professor David Cole from
Georgetown Law School, Shayana Kadidal from the Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR"),
Ashlee Albies from Portland, Oregon, and Bill Goodman from Detroit, Michigan (formerly the
Legal Director at CCR). The briefs were written through the exchange of drafts and redrafts of
various sections and numerous conferences among the five lawyers and were very much a
collective effort. Mr. Kadidal played a particularly pivotal role in coordinating this process and in
preparing the final drafts of briefs for filing. In addition, we had available and we relied on drafts
of briefs filed at various points by lawyers for the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") in
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006), and by the lawyers for the plaintiffs in Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Or. 2006). The plaintiffs'
counsel in Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush have also had numerous conferences with the
lawyers from the Electronic Frontier Foundation representing the plaintiffs in Hepting v. AT&T
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006). I am indebted to my colleagues for their collective
wisdom, although any errors that may exist in this article are my sole responsibility.
1. Much of what the government has disclosed about the TSP is set forth in Al-Haramain
Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007); see also James Taranto, The
Weekend Interview with Dick Cheney: A Strong Executive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2006, at A8
("[Cheney explains the program as] 'the interception of communications, one end of which is
outside the United States, and one end of which, either outside the U.S. or inside, we have reason
to believe is al-Qaeda-connected.'"); Gen. Michael V. Hayden, What American Intelligence and
Especially the NSA Have Been Doing To Defend the Nation, Address to the National Press Club
(Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20060123-speech.htm [hereinafter
Hayden, Press Club] (acknowledging that the NSA Program covers international calls); Press
Release, White House, Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael
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Despite the clear language of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
("FISA")2 and of Title 18 of the United States Code3 that no electronic
surveillance was permitted other than that authorized by statute, the
President claimed inherent power to conduct such surveillance. And
despite the clear intent of Congress that the President should seek an
amendment to FISA to authorize extraordinary surveillance lasting more
than fifteen days during wartime,4 the President did not seek such an
amendment and instead acted unilaterally and in secret. President Bush
reauthorized the TSP, again in secret, multiple times, and originally
intended to continue doing so indefinitely.5
The electronic surveillance conducted by the NSA on the orders of
the President raised serious constitutional questions concerning the sepa-
ration of powers and the scope of protection provided by the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. These issues quickly became
the subject of litigation as several lawsuits were filed to try to enjoin the
program or obtain damages for persons who had been subjected to war-
rantless electronic surveillance.6 The government moved to dismiss the
suits on the ground that the cases could not be litigated without the dis-
Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html [hereinafter Gonzales/Hayden,
Press Briefing] ("The President has authorized a program to engage in electronic surveillance
..... "); President's News Conference, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1885 (Dec. 19, 2005)
(noting that "calls" are intercepted); President's Radio Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1880, 1881 (Dec. 17, 2005) ("In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our Nation, I
authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to
intercept the international communications of people with known links to Al Qaida and related
terrorist organizations.").
2. 50 U.S.C. § 1801-1862 (2000).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).
4. 50 U.S.C. § 1811.
5. President's News Conference, supra note 1, at 1885 ("I've reauthorized this program
more than 30 times since the September the 11 th attacks, and I intend to do so for so long as our
Nation is-for so long as the nation faces the continuing threat of an enemy that wants to kill
American citizens.").
6. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644
(6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 07-468, 2008 WL 423556, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008); Al-
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 507 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Ctr. for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006). One important
issue in these cases is the standing of the plaintiffs to challenge the electronic surveillance
program. Other than in AI-Haramain, there is no evidence that any particular plaintiffs were in
fact subjected to surveillance. Plaintiffs in the Center for Constitutional Rights and ACLU cases
alleged that they had standing because their professional responsibilities required them to
communicate with persons who were suspected of being members of al Qaeda, or otherwise likely
to be targets of the TSP, and that they were required to alter their behavior as a result of the risk of
having privileged communications overheard by the government. The Sixth Circuit rejected the
ACLU plaintiffs' standing argument in ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, No. 07-468, 2008 WL 423556, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008).
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closure of state secrets.7 The government then successfully moved to
consolidate most of the cases through the multidistrict-litigation panel.8
The government has been remarkably successful at avoiding any
definitive resolution of the constitutional issues in this controversy. At
the time of this writing, court decisions have been rendered on some of
the preliminary issues raised by the cases,9 and one district judge has
addressed the merits and issued an injunction against the government, 10
although that decision was vacated on appeal on the ground that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the program." But it is
unclear when, if ever, the U.S. Supreme Court will confront the question
of the President's power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance
of foreign threats to national security. By way of comparison, in the
case that is the closest parallel with respect to the constitutional issues,
President Harry Truman issued an executive order during the Korean
War seizing the steel mills on April 8, 1952, the suit challenging his
actions was argued in the Supreme Court on May 12 and 13, 1952, and
the Court issued its decision concluding the President lacked the power
to make the seizure on June 2, 1952.12
Part II of this article provides the history of the Bush administra-
tion's warrantless electronic surveillance after September 11, 2001.
Part III lays out the statutory framework that existed under FISA.
It discusses the principal arguments concerning the question whether the
President has inherent power to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance of suspected foreign threats to national security. This section
argues that in the face of Congress's clear decision that such surveil-
lance required a judicial warrant, the President had no inherent authority
to engage in surveillance without a warrant. The section also discusses
and rejects the government's argument that the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force ("AUMF'), issued by Congress following Sep-
tember 11, impliedly authorized the TSP.
Part IV discusses the state-secrets privilege and the question
whether the judicial branch may entertain challenges to the TSP in the
7. See discussion infra Part III on state secrets. The issue arose in different ways in the
various cases. In Center for Constitutional Rights, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment before
any discovery was conducted and took the position that no discovery was necessary. The CCR
plaintiffs argued that the statutory and constitutional issues in the case could be decided on the
basis of the public record.
8. Transfer Order at 1-3, In re NSA Telecomms. Records Litig., No. 06-1791, 2007 WL
3306579 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2007).
9. See AI-Haramain Islamic Found., 507 F.3d at 1203-04; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at
979-80.
10. ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
11. ACLU, 493 F.3d at 687-88.
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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face of the assertion of that privilege. It argues that the courts must
determine the constitutionality of the TSP by reference to first principles
and that state secrets are not essential to that inquiry. This argument is
buttressed by the fact that the Supreme Court has resolved other signifi-
cant constitutional controversies and that the existence of "state secrets"
has not been a bar to the Court's ability to resolve bedrock separation-
of-powers issues.
Part V discusses the change in the Bush administration's strategy in
January 2007 when it sought and obtained orders from the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court ("FISA Court" or "FISC") authorizing elec-
tronic surveillance that had been conducted previously through the TSP.
It argues that this change did not render moot the legal challenges pend-
ing to the TSP.
Part VI addresses the question of the constitutionality of the amend-
ments to FISA that were enacted in August 2007. It concludes that even
as authorized by Congress, warrantless electronic surveillance violates
the Fourth Amendment. In particular, the article rejects the govern-
ment's assertion that the special-needs exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment justifies this surveillance.
The article concludes that warrantless electronic surveillance under
the TSP was beyond the President's powers under Article II, given Con-
gress's clear proscription of such surveillance. It further concludes that
warrantless electronic surveillance is beyond the powers of the federal
government even with Congressional approval, owing to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
As part of the TSP,13 NSA targeted for interception "calls ... [the
government has] a reasonable basis to believe involve al Qaeda or one of
its affiliates."' 4 NSA also targeted the communications of individuals it
deemed suspicious on the basis of NSA' s belief that the targeted individ-
uals had some unspecified "link" to al Qaeda or unspecified related ter-
rorist organizations, 5 that they belonged to an organization that the
13. On two occasions since its inception, the government has acknowledged changing the
program in significant ways. The program became a moving target in the face of litigation
challenging the constitutionality of this electronic surveillance, and in the face of occasional
congressional criticism. The history of the program is described in this introduction.
14. Hayden, Press Club, supra note 1.
15. President's News Conference, supra note 1, at 1885 ("I authorized the interception of
international communications of people with known links to Al Qaida and related terrorist
organizations."); President's Radio Address, supra note 1, at 1881 ("Before we intercept these
communications, the Government must have information that establishes a clear link to these
terrorist networks."); Taranto, supra note 1 ("(Cheney explains the program as] 'the interception
of communications, one end of which ... we have reason to believe is al-Qaeda-connected."');
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government considers to be "affiliated" with al Qaeda,' 6 that they had
provided some unspecified support for al Qaeda, 17 or that they "want to
kill Americans."' 8 Information collected under the program was some-
times retained and sometimes disseminated. 9 The Attorney General
refused to specify the number of Americans whose communications
have been or are being intercepted under the TSP.2 °
NSA intercepted communications under the TSP without obtaining
a warrant or judicial authorization.2" Apparently, neither the President
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Ask the White House (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.white
house.gov/ask/20060125.html ("[The NSA intercepts] international communications involving
someone we reasonably believe is associated with al Qaeda .... "); Letter from William E.
Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Pat
Roberts, Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, John D. Rockefeller, IV, Vice
Chairman, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, and Jane Harman, Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Select Comm.
on Intelligence (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/surveillance6.
pdf [hereinafter Moschella Letter] ("As described by the President, the NSA intercepts certain
international communications into and out of the United States of people linked to al Qaeda or an
affiliated terrorist organization.").
16. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1 (Alberto Gonzales: "[W]e have to have a
reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al Qaeda,
affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda, or working in
support of al Qaeda.").
17. Id.
18. Hayden, Press Club, supra note 1 ("We are going after very specific communications that
our professional judgment tells us we have reason to believe are those associated with people who
want to kill Americans.").
19. Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 42 (2006) [hereinafter Hearings]
("[linformation is collected, information is retained, and information is disseminated in a way to
protect the privacy interests of all Americans.") (testimony of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of
the United States).
20. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1 ("QUESTION: General, are you able to
say how many Americans were caught in this surveillance? / AT7ORNEY GENERAL
GONZALES: I'm not-I can't get into the specific numbers because that information remains
classified. Again, this is not a situation where-of domestic spying. To the extent that there is a
moderate and heavy communication involving an American citizen, it would be a communication
where the other end of the call is outside the United States and where we believe that either the
American citizen or the person outside the United States is somehow affiliated with al Qaeda.").
21. Id. (Michael Hayden: "The period of time in which we do this is, in most cases, far less
than that which would be gained by getting a court order."); Hearings, supra note 19, at 11 ("The
program is triggered only when a career professional at the NSA has reasonable grounds to
believe that one of the parties to a communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an
affiliated terrorist organization." (testimony of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United
States)); Hayden, Press Club, supra note 1 ("QUESTION: ... Just to clarify sort of what's been
said, from what I've heard you say today and an earlier press conference, the change from going
around the FISA law was to--one of them was to lower the standard from what they call for,
which is basically probable cause to a reasonable basis; and then to take it away from a federal
court judge, the FISA court judge, and hand it over to a shift supervisor at NSA. Is that what
we're talking about here-just for clarification? / GEN. HAYDEN: You got most of it right. The
people who make the judgment, and the one you just referred to, there are only a handful of
people at NSA who can make that decision. They're all senior executives, they are all
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
nor the Attorney General authorized the specific interceptions. 22
Instead, an NSA "shift supervisor" was authorized to approve the selec-
tion of targets or of communications to be intercepted.
2 3
Under the TSP, communications were intercepted without probable
cause to believe that the surveillance targets had committed or were
about to commit any crime. Rather, NSA intercepted communications
when the agency had, in its own judgment, merely a "reasonable basis
to conclude that one party to the communication is a member of al
Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affili-
ated with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda. ' '24  Principal
Deputy Director for National Intelligence (and former NSA Director)
General Michael Hayden admitted that "[t]he trigger is quicker and a bit
softer than it is for a FISA warrant, ' '25 and suggested that the standard is
"[i]nherent foreign intelligence value."126  Attorney General Gonzales
also conceded that the standard used is not criminal "probable cause." 27
counterterrorism and al Qaeda experts. So I-even though I-you're actually quoting me back,
Jim, saying, "shift supervisor." To be more precise in what you just described, the person who
makes that decision, a very small handful, senior executive. So in military terms, a senior colonel
or general officer equivalent; and in professional terms, the people who know more about this than
anyone else. / QUESTION: Well, no, that wasn't the real question. The question I was asking,
though, was since you lowered the standard, doesn't that decrease the protections of the U.S.
citizens? And number two, if you could give us some idea of the genesis of this. Did you come
up with the idea? Did somebody in the White House come up with the idea? Where did the idea
originate from? Thank you. / GEN. HAYDEN: Let me just take the first one, Jim. And I'm not
going to talk about the process by which the President arrived at his decision. I think you've
accurately described the criteria under which this operates, and I think I at least tried to accurately
describe a changed circumstance, threat to the nation, and why this approach-limited, focused-
has been effective." Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1 ("IT]he Supreme Court has
long held that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement in-when special needs outside the
law enforcement arena. And we think that that standard has been met here." (statement of Alberto
R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of United States)).
22. Hayden, Press Club, supra note I ("These are communications that we have reason to
believe are al Qaeda communications, a judgment made by American intelligence professionals,
not folks like me or political appointees .... ).
23. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note I (Michael Hayden: "The judgment [to
target a communication] is made by the operational work force at the National Security Agency
using the information available to them at the time, and the standard that they apply-and it's a
two-person standard that must be signed off by a shift supervisor, and carefully recorded as to
what created the operational imperative to cover any target, but particularly with regard to those
inside the United States."); see also Hearings, supra note 19, at 34 (Alberto Gonzales: "The
decisions as to which communications are to be surveilled are made by intelligence experts out at
NSA.").
24. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1 (statement of Alberto Gonzales)
(emphasis added); see also Hayden, Press Club, supra note 1 (explaining that the NSA intercepts
calls it has "a reasonable basis to believe" involves affiliates of al Qaeda).
25. Id.
26. Id. ("Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use to ensure that
we conform to the Fourth Amendment's reasonable standard when it comes to protecting the
privacy of these kinds of people.").
27. Hearings, supra note 19, at 99-100 ("I think it is probable cause. But it is not probable
[Vol. 62:541
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The TSP intercepted communications that were subject to the
requirements of FISA.28 FISA states that "[a] person is guilty of an
offense if he intentionally-(1) engages in electronic surveillance under
color of law except as authorized by statute. '2 9 The Attorney General
admitted that the TSP constituted "electronic surveillance" as defined in
and governed by FISA:
Now, in terms of legal authorities, the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act provides-requires a court order before engaging in this
kind of surveillance that I've just discussed and the President
announced on Saturday, unless there is somehow-there is-unless
otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress. That's what the law
requires.3°
Nonetheless, the TSP was used "in lieu of' the procedures specified
under FISA.3 1 In the words of General Michael Hayden, the Principal
Deputy Director for National Intelligence, "this is a more . 'aggres-
sive' program than would be traditionally available under FSA. 3 2
cause as to guilt ... or probable cause as to a crime being committed. It is probable cause that a
party to the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda. The precise language that I would
like to refer to is a reasonable grounds to believe. Reasonable grounds to believe that a party to
the communication is a member or agent of al Qaeda or of an affiliated terrorist organization....
It is a probable cause standard, in my judgment." (testimony of Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of
the United States).
28. In ACLU v. NSA, Judge Batchelder argued that because the ACLU plaintiffs "have not
shown, and cannot show, that the NSA engages in activities satisfying the statutory definition of
,electronic surveillance' [they] cannot demonstrate that FISA does apply." 493 F.3d 644, 683 (6th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 07-468, 2008 WL 423556, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008); see also id. at
681 ("These factors raise a host of intricate issues, such as whether the NSA's wiretapping
actually involves 'electronic surveillance' as defined in FISA .... "). Judge Batchelder's
argument is willfully blind to Attorney General Gonzales's admission dating back to December
2005 that the surveillance carried out by the program was subject to the strictures of FISA-in
other words, that it constituted "electronic surveillance" under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). In any event,
the claim that the program did not constitute "electronic surveillance' subject to FISA would be
nonsensical in the face of the fact that the government subsequently went to the FISA Court for
orders authorizing what had been done under the TSP, given that the FISA Court's jurisdiction
extends only to authorizing electronic surveillance. Cf id. at 713-17 (Gilman, J. dissenting).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2000).
30. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note I (statement of Alberto Gonzales).
31. Id. (statement of Michael Hayden); see also Hayden, Press Club, supra note I ("If FISA
worked just as well, why wouldn't I use FISA? To save typing? No. There is an operational
impact here, and I have two paths in front of me, both of them lawful, one FISA, one the
presidential-the president's authorization. And we go down this path because our operational
judgment is it is much more effective. So we do it for that reason."); Gonzales/Hayden, Press
Briefing, supra note 1 (Michael Hayden: "What you're asking me is, can we do this program as
efficiently using the one avenue provided to us by the FISA Act, as opposed to the avenue
provided to us by subsequent legislation and the President's authorization. Our operational
judgment, given the threat to the nation that the difference in the operational efficiencies between
those two sets of authorities are such that we can provide greater protection for the nation
operating under this authorization.").
32. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note I (statement of Michael Hayden); see also
Hayden, Press Club, supra note I ("In the instances where this program applies, FISA does not
2008]
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The administration considered asking Congress to amend FISA to
permit the NSA spying program. But it elected not to do so until August
2007 and instead originally ordered its implementation in secret. Attor-
ney General Gonzales acknowledged that administration officials con-
sulted various members of Congress about seeking legislation to
authorize the TSP but initially chose not to do so because they were
advised that it would be "difficult if not impossible" to obtain.33
Despite the government's argument that it could not conduct the
electronic surveillance it needed to conduct within the limits of FISA, on
January 10, 2007, the FISA Court
issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection
international communications into or out of the United States where
there is probable cause to believe that one of the [parties to the com-
munication] is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terror-
ist organization.34
The government subsequently took the position that, because of the new
"FISA Court orders, any electronic surveillance that [had been] occur-
ring as part of the TSP [was then] being conducted subject to the
approval of the FISA Court, and [that] the President ha[d] decided not to
reauthorize the TSP."3
5
The government then argued that the legal challenges to the TSP
were moot as a result of the FISA Court orders. The plaintiffs in the
various cases argued that voluntary cessation of illegal activity in the
face of a court challenge does not render the challenge moot.36
In the summer of 2007, the Bush administration changed its strat-
egy once again and intensively lobbied Congress to amend FISA to per-
mit warrantless electronic surveillance.37 Congress acquiesced to the
give us the operational effect that the authorities that the president has given us give us.");
Moschella Letter, supra note 15 ("[T]he President determined that it was necessary following
September 11 to create an early warning detection system. FISA could not have provided the
speed and agility required for the early warning detection system.").
33. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1 (Alberto Gonzales: "We have had
discussions with Congress in the past-certain members of Congress-as to whether or not FISA
could be amended to allow us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that
that would be difficult, if not impossible.").
34. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, & Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary (Jan. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Gonzales Letter], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.coml
packages/pdf/politics/20060117gonzalesLetter.pdf.
35. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment in Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush at 2, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights
v. Bush, No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17, 2006); see also Brief for the United
States at 9-10, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 508 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-17137).
36. See infra Part IV, discussing whether the legal challenges were rendered moot.
37. See Letter from J.M. McConnell, Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, to Harry Reid, Majority
Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. (July 27, 2007) (on file with the University of Miami Law Review).
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administration and in August enacted amendments that permitted the
warrantless electronic surveillance of any person reasonably believed to
be outside of the United States.38 Presumably, any foreign-intelligence
electronic surveillance that is taking place at the time of this writing is
being conducted under the 2007 amendments to FISA.
III. THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. The Statutory Scheme Regulating Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Before the Legislation Enacted in August 2007
FISA regulates electronic surveillance for foreign-intelligence and
national-security purposes within the United States.39 Congress enacted
FISA in 1978 after revelations of widespread spying on Americans by
federal law-enforcement and intelligence agencies-including NSA.4"
The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the legislation was "in large
measure a response to the revelations that warrantless electronic surveil-
lance in the name of national security has been seriously abused."41
FISA was intended to strike a careful balance between protecting civil
liberties and preserving the "vitally important government purpose" of
obtaining valuable intelligence in order to safeguard national security.4 2
With minor exceptions, FISA authorized "electronic surveillance"
38. See infra Part V for a discussion of the amendments and the constitutionality of the new
statutory framework.
39. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1862 (2000).
40. A special congressional committee known as the Church Committee (after its Chairman,
Sen. Frank Church) concluded, after lengthy investigation and hearings:
The application of vague and elastic standards for wiretapping and bugging has
resulted in electronic surveillances which, by any objective measure, were improper
and seriously infringed the Fourth Amendment Rights of both the targets and those
with whom the targets communicated. The inherently intrusive nature of electronic
surveillance, moreover, has enabled the Government to generate vast amounts of
information-unrelated to any legitimate government interest-about the personal
and political lives of American citizens. The collection of this type of information
has, in turn, raised the danger of its use for partisan political and other improper
ends by senior administration officials.
S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 8 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3909.
The Church Committee noted that Congress had "a particular obligation to examine the NSA,
in light of its tremendous potential for abuse." The National Security Agency and Fourth
Amendment Rights: Hearings Before the S. Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 2 (1975), available at http://cryptome.org/nsa-4th.
htm (statement of Sen. Church, Chairman, S. Select Comm. To Study Governmental Operations
with Respect to Intelligence Activities). In its final report, the Church Committee warned that
"[u]nless new and tighter controls are established by legislation, domestic intelligence activities
threaten to undermine our democratic society and fundamentally alter its nature." S. Rep. No. 94-
755, at 1 (1976).
41. S. Rep. No. 95-604, at 7 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908.
42. Id. at 9, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3910.
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for foreign-intelligence purposes only on certain specified showings and
only if approved by the FISA Court, which the legislation established.
FISA governs only statutorily defined "electronic surveillance," princi-
pally surveillance targeted at U.S. citizens or permanent residents within
the United States or electronic surveillance gathered within the United
States.43 Accordingly, as originally enacted, FISA left ungoverned
interceptions made abroad of a foreign target's electronic communica-
tions. Electronic surveillance, as originally governed by FISA, was per-
missible on a court order, which had to be based on a showing of
probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a "foreign power" or
an "agent of a foreign power." This would include a member of any
"group engaged in international terrorism." 44 FISA does not require
43. Before the 2007 amendments, FISA defined "electronic surveillance" in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(f) to include:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received
by a particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the
contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States,
without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United
States;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device of the contents of any radio communication, under
circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a
warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and
all intended recipients are located within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a
wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes.
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) and (b) define foreign powers and agents of foreign powers:
(a) "Foreign power" means-
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized
by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
(b) "Agent of a foreign power" means-
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probable cause of criminal activity to justify electronic surveillance.
Congress sought to make clear that electronic surveillance was to
be undertaken only under federal statute. To that end, Congress
expressly provided that FISA and specified provisions of the federal
criminal code (which govern wiretaps for criminal investigations) are
the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... may be con-
ducted."45 To underscore the point, Congress made it a crime, under
two separate provisions of the U.S. Code, to undertake electronic sur-
veillance not authorized by statute. FISA itself made it a crime to con-
duct "electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute."46 Title 18 is even more explicit: 18 U.S.C. § 2511 makes it a
crime to conduct wiretapping except as "specifically provided in this
chapter," § 2511(1), or as authorized by FISA.
Signing FISA into law, President Carter acknowledged that it
applied to all electronic surveillance, stating:
The bill requires, for the first time, a prior judicial warrant for
all electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence or counterintel-
ligence purposes in the United States in which communications of
U.S. persons might be intercepted. It clarifies the Executive's author-
ity to gather foreign intelligence by electronic surveillance in the
(1) any person other than a United States person, who-
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or
as a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine
intelligence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person's presence in the United States
indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or when
such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such activities or
knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
(C) engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore; or
(2) any person who-
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or
on behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or on
behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve a
violation of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that
are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for
or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a
false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (emphasis added).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1).
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United States. 47
In subjecting foreign-intelligence electronic surveillance to strict
statutory limits, FISA marked a substantial change in the law. Before
FISA's enactment, Congress had chosen not to regulate foreign-intelli-
gence surveillance. In fact, when Congress regulated criminal wiretaps
in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
it expressly recognized that it was leaving unregulated foreign-intelli-
gence surveillance:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the
constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he
deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential
attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intel-
ligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States, or to protect national security information against foreign
intelligence activities.4 8
When Congress enacted FISA, however, it repealed the above provision,
and substituted the language quoted above providing that FISA and Title
III were the "exclusive means" for engaging in electronic surveillance
and that any such surveillance conducted outside the authority of those
statutes was not only prohibited, but a crime.
Congress specifically addressed in FISA the question of domestic
wiretapping during wartime. In 18 U.S.C. § 1811, entitled "Authoriza-
tion during time of war," FISA dictated that "[n]otwithstanding any
other law, the President, through the Attorney General, may authorize
electronic surveillance without a court order under this subchapter to
acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed fif-
teen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress."49
Thus, even when Congress declares war, the law limited warrantless
wiretapping to the first fifteen days of the conflict. The legislative his-
tory of this provision explains that if the President needed further sur-
veillance powers because of the special nature of the particular war at
hand, fifteen days would be sufficient for Congress to consider and enact
further statutory authorization.5 °
Congress also anticipated that emergencies might require the gov-
47. Statement on Signing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 2 PuB. PAPERS
1853 (Oct. 25, 1978).
48. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2511(3), 82 Stat. 197 (emphasis added).
49. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (emphasis added).
50. "The Conferees intend that this [15-day] period will allow time for consideration of any
amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a wartime emergency .... The conferees
expect that such amendment would be reported with recommendations within 7 days and that each
House would vote on the amendment within 7 days thereafter." H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34
(1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4063, 4048.
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emiment to initiate electronic surveillance before a warrant can be
obtained. The original legislation allowed the government to intercept
conversations without a warrant for twenty-four hours while it sought a
warrant from the court. In December 2001 Congress subsequently
amended FISA to extend that time period from twenty-four to seventy-
two hours with this emergency-warrant provision. 1
B. The Terrorist Surveillance Program and the Constitutional
Powers of the President52
Both FISA and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 specify that foreign-intelligence
electronic surveillance must be conducted under statute and court order.
Despite the specific legislation directly on point, President Bush
declined to ask Congress to amend FISA to permit the TSP to go for-
ward. He did seek other amendments to FISA in the immediate after-
math of the terrorist attacks of September 11 in what ultimately became
the USA PATRIOT Act.53 On its face, because the TSP conducted
"electronic surveillance" outside of the process carefully prescribed by
FISA, it would seem evident that the TSP violated FISA and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511, and that it was contrary to law.54
The government argued that the TSP was legal and constitutional
for two reasons. First, it submitted that the President has inherent con-
stitutional authority to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance of
foreign targets that are national-security threats, whether or not Congress
has authorized such surveillance. Second, the government argued that
Congress had in fact authorized the surveillance by passing the AUMF
after September 11. Neither argument is persuasive.
51. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f ), amended by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 314 (a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001).
52. The TSP was also subject to attack on the ground that it violated the Fourth Amendment
for the President to engage in warrantless electronic surveillance, regardless of whether Congress
had authorized it. See discussion infra Part V detailing Fourth Amendment argument.
53. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
54. The Congressional Research Service independently found that the NSA program violates
federal law. See Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative
Attorneys, Am. Law Div., Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Authority To Conduct Warrantless
Electronic Surveillance To Gather Foreign Intelligence Information (Jan. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf. To the extent that the NSA spying program
violated federal law and the Constitution, and was therefore "contrary to law," it could be argued
that it gave rise to injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (2000) (stating that a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action"
that is "otherwise not in accordance with law," and that is taken "in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations").
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C. Whether the President Has Inherent Constitutional Authority To
Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance
The TSP violated basic principles of the separation of powers.
Wiretapping Americans, even during wartime, is not an exclusive execu-
tive prerogative immune from regulation by the other branches.
Through FISA, foreign-intelligence wiretapping has been subject to leg-
islative and judicial checks for nearly thirty years, and its constitutional-
ity in so restricting the Executive has not previously been challenged.
Analysis of the separation-of-powers question presented by the
NSA spying program is governed by Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer and particularly by Justice Jackson's influential concurring opin-
ion in it." In that case, the Supreme Court held that President Truman
had no implied constitutional power as commander in chief to seize
American steel companies to assure the production of materials neces-
sary to prosecute the Korean War. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Jackson analyzed three different situations in which the President might
attempt to exercise implied power under the Constitution: (1) Presiden-
tial action under an express or implied authorization by Congress, in
which case Presidential authority is at is maximum; (2) Presidential
action in the face of Congressional silence, which Justice Jackson char-
acterized as a "zone of twilight"; and (3) Presidential action contrary to
the expressed or implied will of Congress, in which case Presidential
power is at "its lowest ebb."56
The TSP falls within Justice Jackson's third category, because
FISA expressly required individualized judicial approval of foreign-
intelligence-electronic surveillance of the type involved in the TSP and
made it a crime to engage in electronic surveillance without statutory
authority. Because the President acted in contravention of FISA's
express limits, his constitutional power is at its "lowest ebb," and he
may act in contravention of statute only if Congress may be "disabl[ed]
• . . from acting upon the subject"57 of foreign-intelligence electronic
surveillance within the United States. In fact, Congress acted well
within its Article I powers in regulating executive intrusions on the pri-
vacy of U.S. persons in international-electronic communications and did
not intrude on the President's Article II role.
There is no doubt that Presidents have routinely collected signals
intelligence on the enemy during wartime. Indeed, for most of our his-
tory Congress did not regulate foreign intelligence gathering in any way.
But as Justice Jackson made clear in Youngstown, to say that a President
55. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
56. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 637-38.
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may undertake certain conduct in the absence of contrary congressional
action does not mean that he may undertake that action where Congress
has addressed the issue and disapproved of the action.58 Here, Congress
has not only disapproved of the action the President has taken, but it has
made it a crime.
The remaining question, then, is whether Congress is disabled from
acting on the subject. The administration has argued that the President
has exclusive constitutional authority over "the means and methods of
engaging the enemy[,]" 59 and that FISA, therefore, is unconstitutional if
it prohibits warrantless "electronic surveillance" deemed necessary by
the President in the conflict with al Qaeda.6 ° The Justice Department
has also argued that even if Congress may regulate "signals intelligence"
during wartime to some degree, FISA impermissibly intrudes on the
President's exercise of his commander in chief role if it precludes war-
rantless wiretapping of Americans in the context of the NSA spying pro-
gram.61 Case law and historical precedent directly contradict the
argument that conduct undertaken by the commander in chief that has
some relevance to "engaging the enemy" is immune from congressional
regulation. Every time the Supreme Court has confronted a statute limit-
ing the commander in chief's authority, it has upheld the statute. No
precedent holds that the President, when acting as commander in chief,
is free to disregard an act of Congress designed specifically to restrain
the President.
There can be no serious dispute that Congress's Article I powers
afford it the authority to regulate wiretapping of U.S. persons on Ameri-
can soil. Further, the Supreme Court in United States v. United States
District Court (Keith), expressly held that Congress had the power to set
forth reasonable standards governing the warrant process for domestic
national-security surveillance:
We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic secur-
ity warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought to set the
refined requirements for the specified criminal surveillances which
now constitute Title III. We do hold, however, that prior judicial
approval is required for the type of domestic security surveillance
involved in this case and that such approval may be made in accor-
dance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may
58. See id. at 635-38.
59. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security
Agency Described by the President 32 n. 15 (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter DOJ Memo], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf.
60. Id. at 29-35.
61. Id.
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prescribe.62
As Congress properly recognized in enacting FISA, 63 "even if the Presi-
dent has the inherent authority in the absence of legislation to authorize
warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes,
Congress ... [can] regulate the conduct of such surveillance by legislat-
ing a reasonable procedure, which then becomes the exclusive means by
which such surveillance may be conducted."'  This analysis was "sup-
ported by two successive Attorneys General. 65
62. 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972).
63. Indeed, Congress modeled FISA along lines suggested by the Supreme Court in Keith:
Given those potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveillances and
those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish to consider protective
standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified
crimes in Title I. . . . [T]he warrant application may vary according to the
governmental interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving
protection ....
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit
showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but
should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases; that
the request for prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any
member of a specially designated court (e.g., the District Court for the District of
Columbia or the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit); and that the
time and reporting requirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518.
Id. at 322-23.
64. H.R. REP. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978).
65. Id.; see also Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R.
9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 31 (1978) (letter from John M. Harmon, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Edward P. Boland, Chairman, H. Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence) ("[I]t seems unreasonable to conclude that Congress, in the exercise of its powers in
this area, may not vest in the courts the authority to approve intelligence surveillance."). Attorney
General Griffin Bell supported FISA in part because "no matter how well intentioned or ingenious
the persons in the Executive branch who formulate these measures, the crucible of the legislative
process will ensure that the procedures will be affirmed by that branch of government which is
more directly responsible to the electorate." Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978:
Hearings on S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 12 (1978); S. REP. No. 95-604, at 16 (1977), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3917 ("The basis for this legislation-concurred in by the
Attorney General-that even if the President has an 'inherent' constitutional power to authorize
warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, Congress has the power to regulate the
exercise of this authority by legislating a reasonable warrant procedure governing foreign
intelligence surveillance.").
President Ford's Attorney General Edward Levi, testifying before a Senate Judiciary
subcommittee in support of FISA, stated:
I really cannot imagine a President, if this legislation is in effect, going outside the
legislation for matters which are within the scope of this legislation .... I really do
not think its is quite appropriate to describe the Presidential authority as either being
absolute on the one hand, or nonexistent on the other. . . . [T]here is a middle
category where, assuming Presidential authority, that authority nevertheless, can be
directed by the Congress.
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In fact, FISA establishes a reasonable procedure and expressly per-
mits wiretapping of foreign agents, including members of international
terrorist organizations and merely requires judicial confirmation that
there is a factual basis for doing so. First, FISA is triggered only when
surveillance is targeting a "United States person who is in the United
States," or the surveillance "acquisition occurs in the United States."66
FISA does not regulate electronic surveillance acquired abroad and
targeted at non-U.S. persons. Thus, it does not limit in any respect
wholly foreign surveillance of al Qaeda, or indeed even of all persons in
Afghanistan.
Second, even when the target of surveillance is a U.S. person
within the United States, or the information is physically acquired within
the United States, FISA permits wiretaps approved by the FISA Court
based on a showing of probable cause that the target is an "agent of a
foreign power," which includes a member of a terrorist organization.6 7
Because FISA leaves unregulated electronic surveillance conducted
outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. persons, it leaves to
the President's unfettered discretion a wide swath of "signals intelli-
gence." Moreover, FISA does not actually prohibit any signals intelli-
gence regarding al Qaeda, but merely requires judicial approval where
the surveillance targets a U.S. person or is acquired here. As such, the
statute cannot reasonably be said to intrude impermissibly on the Presi-
dent's ability to "engage the enemy," and certainly does not come any-
where close to "prohibit[ing] the President from undertaking actions
necessary to fulfill his constitutional obligation to protect the Nation
from foreign attack[,]" as the Justice Department has asserted.68
The President's broad assertion of unchecked authority to choose
the "means and methods of engaging the enemy" finds no support in the
text of the Constitution or the history of executive-legislative interac-
tions during wartime. Every time the Supreme Court has addressed the
propriety of executive action contrary to congressional statute during
wartime, it has required the President to adhere to legislative limits on
his authority.69 In Youngstown, as noted above, the Court invalidated
President Truman's wartime seizure of the steel mills, where Congress
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976: Hearing on S. 743, S. 1888, and S. 3197 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 16
(1976).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f(l)-(2) (2000).
67. See id. §§ 1801 (a)-(b), 1805(a)-(b). If the target is not a U.S. person, it is sufficient to
show that he is a "lone wolf' terrorist. See id. § 1801(b)(l).
68. DOJ Memo, supra note 59, at 35 (emphasis omitted).
69. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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had "rejected an amendment which would have authorized such govern-
mental seizures in cases of emergency.
'
"70
In Little v. Barreme, the Court held unlawful a seizure pursuant to
presidential order of a ship during the "Quasi War" with France. 71 The
Court found that Congress had authorized the seizure only of ships
going to France, and therefore the President could not unilaterally order
the seizure of a ship coming from France.72 Just as in Youngstown, the
Court invalidated executive action taken during wartime, said to be nec-
essary to the war effort, but implicitly disapproved by Congress.7 3
President Bush's unilateral executive action with respect to NSA is
more sharply in conflict with congressional legislation than the presiden-
tial actions in either Youngstown or Barreme. In those cases, Congress
had merely failed to give the President the authority in question, and
thus the statutory limitation was implicit. Here, Congress went further
and expressly prohibited the President from taking the action in ques-
tion. And it did so in the strongest way possible, by making the conduct
a crime.
More recent Supreme Court decisions, in the context of the current
conflict with al Qaeda, reaffirm the teachings of Youngstown and Bar-
reme. In Rasul v. Bush,7 4 the administration maintained that it would be
unconstitutional to interpret the habeas-corpus statute to afford judicial
review to enemy combatants held at Guantarnamo Bay because it "would
directly interfere with the Executive's conduct of the military campaign
against al Qaeda and its supporters,' 75 and would raise "grave constitu-
tional problems."76 The six-justice majority refused to accept this argu-
ment, and held that Congress had conferred habeas jurisdiction on the
federal courts to entertain the detainees' habeas actions.77 Justice Scalia,
writing for the three dissenters, agreed that Congress could have
extended habeas jurisdiction to the Guant~inamo detainees, and differed
70. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586.
71. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 178.
72. Id. at 176-78.
73. Similarly, in Ex parte Milligan, the Court unanimously held that the Executive violated
the Habeas Corpus Act by failing to discharge from military custody a petitioner held by order of
the President and charged with, inter alia, affording aid and comfort to rebels, inciting
insurrection, and violation of the laws of war. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 115-17, 131 (1866); see also
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (finding that President had no authority to detain loyal U.S.
citizen during war where Congress had not authorized it); Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 133
(Chase, C.J., concurring) ("The constitutionality of this act has not been questioned and is not
doubted.... [But the act] limited this authority [of the President to suspend habeas] in important
respects.").
74. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
75. Brief for the Respondents at 42, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334).
76. Id. at 44.
77. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
[Vol. 62:541
WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
only about whether Congress had in fact done so. 78 Thus, not a single
Justice accepted the Bush administration's contention that the Presi-
dent's role as commander in chief may not be limited by congressional
and judicial oversight.
Similarly, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,79 the Court rejected the Presi-
dent's argument that courts may not inquire into the factual basis for the
detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant.80 As Justice
O'Connor wrote for the plurality, "[w]hatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assur-
edly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are
at stake."8
Detaining enemy combatants captured on the battlefield is surely
closer to the core of "engaging the enemy" than is warrantless wiretap-
ping of U.S. persons within the United States. Yet the Supreme Court in
the enemy-combatant cases squarely held that both Congress and the
courts had a proper role to play in reviewing and restricting the Presi-
dent's detention power. These cases thus refute the administration's
contention that Congress may not enact statutes that regulate and limit
the President's choices of the "means and methods of engaging the
enemy" as commander in chief.
The Constitution's text confirms this conclusion. The Framers of
the Constitution made the President the commander in chief, but other-
wise assigned substantial power to Congress in connection with war
making. Article I gives Congress the power to declare war and to
authorize more limited forms of military enterprises (through "Letters of
Marque and Reprisal");82 to raise and support the army and navy;8 3 to
prescribe "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;"84 to define "Offenses against the Law of Nations;"85 and
to spend federal dollars.86 In addition, Congress has expansive authority
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.' '8 7 The President, meanwhile, is constitutionally obligated to
78. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
80. See id. at 533 (plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 536 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I1.
83. Id. cls. 12-13.
84. Id. cl. 14
85. Id. cl. 10.
86. Id. cl. 1.
87. Id. cl. 18.
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"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"88 which, of course,
would include FISA. The commander in chief's role is not even
described as a "power," and is plainly subject to the legislative powers
assigned to Congress by Article I. These constitutional provisions make
clear that although the Framers recognized the necessity and desirability
of giving the President the authority to direct the troops, the Framers
also recognized the real dangers of Presidential wartime authority-and
sought very explicitly to limit that authority by vesting in Congress
broad authority to create, fund, and regulate the very forces that engage
the enemy. These textual provisions cannot be read to afford the Presi-
dent unchecked authority to choose the "means and methods of engaging
the enemy."
History also supports this conclusion. Congress has routinely
enacted statutes regulating the commander in chief's "means and meth-
ods of engaging the enemy." It has subjected the Armed Forces to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which expressly restricts the means
the President may employ in "engaging the enemy."89 It has enacted
statutes setting forth the rules for governing occupied territory, and these
statutes displace presidential regulations governing such "enemy terri-
tory" in the absence of legislation. 90 And most recently, it has enacted
statutes prohibiting torture under all circumstances, 9 and prohibiting the
use of inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment by U.S. officials and
military personnel anywhere in the world. 92
If the Bush administration were correct that Congress cannot inter-
fere with the commander in chief's discretion in "engaging the enemy,"
all of these statutes would be unconstitutional. Torturing a suspect, no
less than wiretapping an American, might provide information about the
enemy that could conceivably help prevent a future attack, yet President
Bush has conceded that Congress can prohibit that conduct.93 Congress
has as much authority to regulate wiretapping of Americans as it has to
regulate torture and inhuman treatment of foreign detainees. 94 Accord-
88. Id. art. 1, § 3.
89. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
90. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1909).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.
92. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739-40
(2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd).
93. In an interview on CBS News, President Bush said, "I don't think a President can order
torture, for example .... There are clear red lines." Eric Lichtblau & Adam Liptak, Bush and
His Senior Aides Press On in Legal Defense for Wiretapping Program, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006,
at A13.
94. The DOJ Memo oddly suggested that Congress's authority to enact FISA is less clear than
was the power of Congress to act in Youngstown and Little v. Barreme, both of which involved
congressional action at what the DOJ calls the "core" of Congress's enumerated Article I
powers-regulating commerce. DOJ Memo, supra note 59, at 32-34. But FISA was also enacted
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ingly, the President cannot simply contravene Congress's clear criminal
prohibitions on electronic surveillance.
In support of its argument that the President's actions were consti-
tutional, the Justice Department relied on a FISA Court decision and a
series of lower federal-court cases that addressed the issue of the Presi-
dent's power. In In re Sealed Case, the FISA Court did assume, in dic-
tum, that the President has some inherent authority to gather foreign
intelligence, and that Congress cannot "encroach on the President's con-
stitutional power."95 But the court plainly did not mean that any regula-
tion of foreign intelligence gathering amounts to impermissible
"encroachment," because it upheld FISA in that very case (as has every
court to consider it since its enactment in 1978). Indeed, the court did
not even attempt to define what sorts of regulations would constitute
impermissible "encroachment."
All of the lower federal-court cases that have recognized inherent
presidential authority to conduct foreign-intelligence surveillance
addressed the President's pre-FISA authority. The President's authority
before FISA was enacted differed radically from his authority after
FISA. Before FISA was enacted, Congress had left open the question
whether the President has "constitutional power . . . to obtain foreign
intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States."9 6 Before FISA, the President was acting "in the absence of
either a Congressional grant or denial of authority" and acting in Justice
Jackson's "category two," the "zone of twilight" in which the President
and Congress "may have concurrent authority, or in which [the] distribu-
tion [of power] is uncertain."97
But when Congress enacted FISA in the wake of demonstrated
abuses of that power, it repealed the provision approving of inherent-
presidential foreign-intelligence gathering, and made it a crime to con-
duct wiretapping without congressional authority. In authorizing NSA
to conduct warrantless wiretapping in contravention of FISA's criminal
under "core" Article I powers-including the same foreign-commerce power at issue in Little,
and, as applied to NSA, Congress's powers under the Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the Land and Naval Forces, and the Necessary and Proper Clauses.
95. 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970) (repealed 1978). The Government argued in Keith that this
provision in Title III amounted to recognition by Congress that the President had authority to
conduct electronic surveillance in national-security cases without judicial approval. The Supreme
Court flatly rejected this contention and concluded that the section conferred no power on the
President, but merely meant that Congress was not legislating in Title HI with respect to national-
security surveillances. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 303-06, 308
(1972). The Court held that Title II left the President only with such power as the Constitution
might confer with respect to national-security surveillance and neither expanded nor contracted
such power. Id. at 308.
97. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J. concurring).
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prohibition, the President is therefore acting in Justice Jackson's "cate-
gory three." There, the President's power is at its "lowest ebb." Thus,
that some lower federal courts may have ruled that the President may
have had the power to act when Congress had been silent with respect to
his power does not mean that the President can choose to violate a duly
enacted criminal prohibition after Congress has "acted upon the
subject."98
The authority on which the government relies to establish the Presi-
dent's constitutional authority is unconvincing. United States v. Clay,99
United States v. Brown,"°° and United States v. Butenko,'0 I were decided
before FISA was enacted, which severely undercuts their precedential
authority. The analysis in these cases is exceedingly brief, shallow, and
unpersuasive.1°' United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, °3 although
decided after FISA, involved surveillance that ended well before FISA
was passed,'" and conducts such an abbreviated analysis that it men-
tions the new statute only in a footnote and contains no analysis of
FISA's impact on the President's implied authority under Justice Jack-
son's concurrence in Youngstown.10 5 Judge Skelly Wright conducted a
far more thorough, historical, and scholarly analysis in Zweibon v.
Mitchell, in the plurality opinion that concluded that the President lacks
constitutional power to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance. °6
That argument has been considerably strengthened by the passage of
FISA, which demonstrated that Congress not only does not recognize
any such general power on the part of the President but has made its
attempted exercise a criminal offense.
Cases that establish the proposition that the President has preemi-
nent authority with respect to the conduct of foreign affairs, such as
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., °7 and Chicago & South-
ern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,08 do not resolve the
98. Cf id. at 638-39 (stating that the President could not ignore Congress's method of seizing
steel mills).
99. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
100. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
101. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
102. For a detailed analysis of the weaknesses of these opinions, see Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d 594, 637-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
103. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
104. The surveillance at issue in Truong terminated in January 1978. Id. at 912 ("Truong's
phone was tapped and his apartment was bugged from May, 1977 to January, 1978.... Truong
and Humphrey were arrested on January 31, 1978."). FISA was enacted in October of that year.
The court's holding therefore can relate only to the pre-FISA regime.
105. See id. at 914 n.4.
106. 516 F.2d at 614.
107. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
108. 333 U.S. 103, 109 (1948).
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question whether the President has the specific power to conduct war-
rantless electronic surveillance." Both of those cases involved presi-
dential power exercised pursuant to congressional authorization.
Moreover, the President's powers as commander in chief do not imply
unilateral control over domestic policies, even those related to the con-
duct of foreign wars. As Justice Jackson warned in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer:
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of
foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country
by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture. 110
Indeed, Jackson explained that an argument that the commander in chief
can act in the domestic sphere without restraint by the other branches
stands the constitutional design on its head:
The purpose of lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the
civilian would control the military, not to enable the military to
subordinate the presidential office. No penance would ever expiate
the sin against free government of holding that a President can escape
control of executive powers by law through assuming his military
role. '
D. The Authorization To Use Military Force as a Potential
Source of Congressional Authority
The government argued that Congress authorized the NSA spying
program when, on September 18, 2001, it enacted the AUMF against the
perpetrators of the attacks on September 11 and those who harbor
them.1 2 The administration's argument was subject to three objections:
109. In Zweibon v. Mitchell, Judge Skelly Wright noted that the recognition of the President's
implied powers in the area of foreign affairs "is inapposite to the question of how those powers are
to be reconciled with the mandate of the Fourth Amendment." 516 F.2d at 621.
110. 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (concurring opinion).
111. Id. at 646. Some statutes might impermissibly interfere with the President's role as
commander in chief. If Congress sought to place authority to direct battlefield operations in an
officer not subject to the President's supervision, for example, such a statute might well violate the
President's role as commander in chief. Similarly, Congress should not be constitutionally
permitted to micromanage tactical decisions in particular battles. But short of such highly
unlikely hypotheticals, Congress has broad leeway to govern and regulate the armed services, to
define the scope of a military conflict, to fund only the weapons and programs it approves, and
certainly to protect the privacy expectations of Americans using telephone and e-mail
communications.
112. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224,
224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541). The Department of Justice set forth in
detail its defense of the NSA program in DOJ Memo, supra note 59.
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(1) it is directly contradicted by specific language in other federal stat-
utes establishing that FISA and the criminal code are the "exclusive
means" for conducting electronic surveillance; (2) it would require a
repeal by implication of those statutes, and there is no basis in this situa-
tion for overcoming the strong presumption against implied repeals; and
(3) it conflicts with the administration's claim that it chose not to ask
Congress to amend FISA to authorize the program because several
members of Congress told them that it would be "difficult, if not impos-
sible," to obtain.
In FISA, Congress directly and specifically regulated domestic
warrantless wiretapping for foreign-intelligence and national-security
purposes, including during wartime. The administration's argument that
the AUMF somehow trumped FISA would require the Court to override
FISA's express and specific language based on an unstated general
"implication" from the AUMF. This runs counter to the well-accepted
rule that specific and "carefully drawn" statutes prevail over general
statutes where there is a conflict.' 13
In light of Congress's specific regulation of electronic surveillance
in FISA, and in particular its proviso that even a declaration of war
authorizes no more than fifteen days of warrantless wiretapping,' 14 there
is no basis for finding in the AUMF's general language implicit author-
ity for unchecked warrantless-domestic wiretapping. Neither the text of
the AUMF nor its legislative history mentions authorizing surveillance,
much less warrantless surveillance of conversations to which one party
is an U.S. person within the United States. Indeed, in rejecting a similar
argument by President Truman when he sought to defend the seizure of
the steel mills during the Korean War on the basis of implied congres-
sional authorization, Justice Frankfurter stated:
It is one thing to draw an intention of Congress from general lan-
guage and to say that Congress would have explicitly written what is
inferred, where Congress has not addressed itself to a specific situa-
tion. It is quite impossible, however, when Congress did specifically
address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of seizure, to find
secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which
Congress consciously withheld. To find authority so explicitly with-
held is not merely to disregard in a particular instance the clear will
of Congress. It is to disrespect the whole legislative process and the
constitutional division of authority between President and
Congress. 115
113. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) ([lit is a
commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the general ... .
114. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
115. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The administration relied on Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 1 6 to argue that,
just as the Supreme Court in that case construed the AUMF to provide
sufficient statutory authorization for detention of American citizens cap-
tured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, the AUMF may also be read to
authorize the President to conduct "signals intelligence" on the enemy,
even if that includes electronic surveillance targeting U.S. persons
within the United States." I7  Warrantless wiretapping of Americans at
home, however, is far less clearly within the ambit of implied war pow-
ers than the power to detain an enemy soldier on a foreign battlefield. I 8
Moreover, FISA specifically addresses wiretapping authority during
wartime." 9
The administration's AUMF argument cannot survive the decision
of the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 120 One of the many ques-
tions at issue in Hamdan was whether the AUMF provided congres-
sional sanction for the military commissions instituted at Guantdinamo
116. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
117. DOJ Memo, supra note 59, at 2.
118. The Department of Justice argued that signals intelligence, like detention, is a
"fundamental incident[ ] of waging war" and therefore is authorized by the AUMF. Id. at 13
(quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519) (internal quotation marks omitted). But what is properly
considered an implied incident of conducting war is affected by the statutory landscape that exists
at the time the war is authorized. Thus, even if warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans
for foreign-intelligence purposes were a traditional incident of war when that subject was
unregulated by Congress-which is far from obvious, at least in cases where the Americans
targeted are not themselves suspected of being foreign agents or in league with terrorists-it can
no longer be an implied incident after the enactment of FISA, which expressly addresses the
situation of war and precludes such conduct beyond the first fifteen days of the conflict.
119. The administration argued that the AUMF might convey more authority than a declaration
of war, noting that a declaration of war is generally only a single sentence. Id. at 26-27. But in
fact, every declaration of war has been accompanied, in the same enactment, by an authorization
to use military force. See Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (declaring war against the
United Kingdom in the War of 1812); Act of May 13, 1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (declaring war
against Mexico in the Mexican American War); Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364, 364
(declaring war against Spain in the Spanish American War); Joint Resolution of Apr. 6, 1917,
ch.1, 40 Stat. 1, 1 (declaring war against Germany in World War I); Joint Resolution of Dec. 7,
1917, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429 (declaring war against Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I); Joint
Resolution of Dec. 8, 1941, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (declaring war against Japan in World War II);
Joint Resolution of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796 (declaring war against Germany in World
War II); Joint Resolution of Dec. I1, 1941, ch. 565, 55 Stat. 797 (declaring war against Italy in
World War II); Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, ch. 323, 56 Stat. 307(declaring war against
Bulgaria in World War II); Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, ch. 324, 56 Stat. 307 (declaring war
against Hungary in World War H); Joint Resolution of June 5, 1942, ch. 325, 56 Stat. 307
(declaring war against Romania in World War II). It would be senseless to declare war without
authorizing the President to use military force in the conflict. In light of that reality, § 1811
necessarily contemplates a situation in which Congress has both declared war and authorized the
use of military force-and even that double authorization permits only fifteen days of warrantless
electronic surveillance. Where, as here, Congress has seen fit only to authorize the use of military
force-and not to declare war-the President cannot assert that he has been granted more
authority than when Congress declares war as well.
120. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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Bay Naval Station. 12' The majority opinion concluded that "there is
nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that
Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Arti-
cle 21 of the UCMJ.' 2  In the absence of such "specific, overriding
authorization,"'' 23 the Court found that Congress had not displaced the
limits on the President's authority to constitute military commissions
that it had previously established with the passage of the UCMJ, a com-
prehensive scheme subjecting such commissions to the laws of war,
including the Geneva Conventions.1 24 With respect to the TSP, a simi-
larly comprehensive scheme regulated wiretapping for foreign-intelli-
gence surveillance, and there is similarly "nothing ... even hinting" at a
congressional intent to change that scheme in the text or legislative his-
121. Id. at 2759
122. Id. at 2775.
123. Id.
124. The concurring opinions reinforce the notion that such a judicial interpretation best
protects the integrity of our political system in times of crisis:
This is not a case, then, where the Executive can assert some unilateral authority to
fill a void left by congressional inaction. It is a case where Congress, in the proper
exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government, and as part of a long
tradition of legislative involvement in matters of military justice, has considered the
subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President's authority. Where a
statute provides the conditions for the exercise of governmental power, its
requirements are the result of a deliberative and reflective process engaging both of
the political branches. Respect for laws derived from the customary operation of the
Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of
crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time
and insulated from the pressures of the moment.
These principles seem vindicated here, for a case that may be of extraordinary
importance is resolved by ordinary rules.
Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.). Indeed, the same
four justices concluded that holding the President accountable to law also strengthens our nation's
ability to deal with danger:
The dissenters say that today's decision would "sorely hamper the President's
ability to confront and defeat a new and deadly enemy." They suggest that it
undermines our Nation's ability to "preven[t] future attacks" of the grievous sort
that we have already suffered. That claim leads me to state briefly what I believe
the majority sets forth both explicitly and implicitly at greater length. The Court's
conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the
Executive a "blank check." Indeed, Congress has denied the President the
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here.
Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he
believes necessary.
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial
insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation's ability to deal with
danger. To the contrary, that insistence strengthens the Nation's ability to
determine-through democratic means -how best to do so. The Constitution
places its faith in those democratic means. Our Court today simply does the same.
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, JJ.) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
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tory of the AUMF. 125
The argument that the AUMF somehow amended FISA belies any
reasonable understanding of legislative intent. An amendment to FISA
of the sort that would be required to authorize the NSA program would
be a significant statutory development, undoubtedly subject to serious
legislative debate. It is decidedly not the sort of thing that Congress
would enact inadvertently, and without having previously mentioned.
As the Supreme Court recently noted, "Congress ... does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes."' 26
The government acknowledged that its statutory-authorization
argument based on the AUMF would require the conclusion that Con-
gress implicitly repealed several sections of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.127 Sec-
tion 2511(2)(f) identifies FISA and specific criminal code provisions as
"the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... may be con-
ducted." In addition, § 2511 makes it a crime to conduct wiretapping
except as "specifically provided in this chapter,"'128 or as authorized by
FISA. 1 29 The AUMF is neither in this chapter (i.e. part of Title III, the
1968 Wiretap Act) nor an amendment to FISA, and, therefore, to find
that it authorized electronic surveillance would require an implicit repeal
of all the above provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored and can be estab-
lished only by "overwhelming evidence" that Congress intended the
repeal.' 31 With respect to the AUMF and FISA there is no such evi-
dence. The Supreme Court has instructed that "the only permissible jus-
tification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes
are irreconcilable." 3 ' Section 2511 and the AUMF are fully reconcila-
ble. The former makes clear that specified existing laws are the "exclu-
sive means" for conducting electronic surveillance, and that conducting
wiretapping outside that specified legal regime is a crime. The AUMF
authorizes only such force as is "necessary and appropriate." 132
Accordingly, there is no basis whatsoever, let alone the "overwhelming
125. Id. at 2775 (Stevens, J.).
126. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See DOJ Memo, supra note 59, at 36 n.21.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l) (2000) (emphasis added).
129. Id. § 2511(2)(e).
130. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 137 (2001).
131. Id. at 141-42 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
132. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541).
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evidence" required, for overcoming the strong presumption against
implied repeals.
The administration's own statements and actions contradicted its
claim that the AUMF afforded it authority to conduct warrantless wire-
taps. As noted above, Attorney General Gonzales admitted that the
administration did not seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA spying
program because some members of Congress advised the administration
that it would be "difficult, if not impossible." '33 The administration can-
not argue, on the one hand, that Congress authorized the NSA program
in the AUMF, and, on the other, that it did not ask Congress for such
authorization because it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to get it.
Other actions by the administration also contradicted its subsequent
assertion that the AUMF authorized warrantless wiretapping of Ameri-
cans. Five weeks after the AUMF was signed, Congress explicitly
amended FISA in several respects when it passed the USA PATRIOT
Act.134 Congress subsequently amended FISA again two months later,
extending from twenty-four to seventy-two hours the emergency-war-
rant provision of 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f). 135 In doing so Congress specifi-
cally found that the seventy-two-hour period was adequate for the
preparation of FISA warrant applications in emergency conditions. 136
Yet, there would have been little need for these amendments if the
AUMF had already given the President the power to conduct unlimited
warrantless electronic surveillance in terrorism cases. Nor was there any
discussion in Congress at the time the PATRIOT Act was passed, or
when FISA was subsequently amended, acknowledging the administra-
tion's view that the AUMF made FISA irrelevant for a whole category
of foreign-intelligence electronic surveillance. These amendments of
FISA undercut the contention that the President had already been given
even broader powers under the AUMF. 13 7
133. Gonzales/Hayden, Press Briefing, supra note 1.
134. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
135. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 314
(a)(2)(B), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001).
136. The House and Senate Conference Committee found, "The conferees agreed to a
provision to extend the time for judicial ratification of an emergency FISA surveillance or search
from 24 to 72 hours. That would give the Government adequate time to assemble an application
without requiring extraordinary effort by officials responsible for the preparation of those
applications." H.R. REP. No. 107-328, at 23 (2001) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1217, 1224.
137. In addition, one of the amendments the administration was contemplating seeking in
2002, in a draft bill leaked to the press entitled the "Domestic Security Enhancement Act of
2003," would have amended 50 U.S.C. § 1811 to extend its fifteen-day authorization for
warrantless wiretapping to situations where Congress had not declared war but only "authorize[d]
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IV. Is IT POSSIBLE To HAVE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S PROGRAM OF WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE IN THE FACE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTION
OF THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE?
In litigation over the TSP, the government responded to the com-
plaints by the various plaintiffs by invoking the state-secrets privilege
and moving to dismiss the lawsuits on the ground that the program's
secrecy made judicial review of the program impossible. 38 In its crud-
est formulation, this argument suggests that the President has unilateral
power to violate the law and then to block any judicial oversight of his
actions by asserting that his violation of law was a secret. The govern-
ment's specific argument was that:
adjudication of the merits of their challenge to the TSP would inher-
ently require the disclosure of a range of classified information as to
which the Director of National Intelligence has properly asserted the
state secrets privilege in this case, including facts that would confirm
or deny whether the Plaintiffs were subject to surveillance under the
TSP, as well as facts concerning the operation of the TSP and the
the use of military force," or where the nation had been attacked. See Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003 § 103, at 1-2 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.pbsorg/now/
politics/patriot2-hi.pdf. If, as the administration later contended, the AUMF gave the President
unlimited authority to conduct warrantless wiretapping of the enemy, it would make no sense to
seek such an amendment.
138. The government filed a series of affidavits and briefs on the public record and others in
camera to justify the assertion of the privilege. In Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, Civil
Action No. 07-1115, this included the public filings of: (1) Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of the United States' Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege;
Defendants' Motion To Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; and Defendants'
Motion To Stay Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for
Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Points and Authorities]; (2) Declaration of John D. Negroponte, Director of
National Intelligence, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No. 06-CV-313; (3) Declaration of Major
General Richard J. Quirk, Signals Intelligence Director, NSA, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No.
06-CV-313; (4) Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion To Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No. 06-CV-313. The government also made
the following classified submissions in support of its motions for the Court's in camera, ex parte
review: (1) In Camera, Ex Pane Classified Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
the United States' Assertion of the Military and State Secrets Privilege; Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendants' Motion to Stay
Consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No.
06-CV-313; (2) In Camera, Ex Pane, Classified Declaration of John D. Negroponte, Director of
National Intelligence; Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No. 06-CV-313 and (3) In Camera, Ex Parte
Classified Declaration of Major General Richard J. Quirk, Signals Intelligence Director, National
Security Agency, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, No. 06-CV-313. In the MDL proceedings before
Judge Vaughn, the government also filed an additional classified declaration by Lieutenant
General Keith B. Alexander, who is, the Director of the National Security Agency, for the Court's
in camera, ex parte review. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion To
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 5 n.6 (citations omitted).
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specific nature of the al Qaeda threat that it sought to address. In
particular, if this case proceeded to the merits, state secrets demon-
strating precisely what the TSP entailed, and why those activities
were reasonable and necessary to meet the al Qaeda theat [sic], would
be essential to any determination as to whether the TSP was within
the President's statutory and constitutional authority, but could not be
disclosed without causing exceptionally grave harm to national
security. 13
9
The state-secrets privilege may be invoked to shield secret information
from discovery and, in rare cases, to dismiss lawsuits if litigation is not
possible without disclosing state secrets. 4 ° Dismissal of claims (or an
entire lawsuit) is proper only in two narrow circumstances. First, dis-
missal may be proper if the "very subject matter" of the lawsuit is itself
a state secret. 4 '
Second, a case may be dismissed on state-secrets grounds if a court
determines, after consideration of non-privileged evidence, that plaintiff
cannot present a prima-facie case or that the government cannot present
a valid defense without resort to privileged evidence. 42 Even then, dis-
missal on the basis of the privilege is proper only if the court determines
that there is no alternative procedure that would protect secrets but still
allow the claims to go forward in some way. Accordingly, courts must
use "creativity and care" to devise "procedures which will protect the
privilege and yet allow the merits of the controversy to be decided in
some form."' 43 Suits may be dismissed under the privilege "[o]nly
when no amount of effort and care on the part of the court and the par-
ties will safeguard privileged material."'"
Under a broad view of the state-secrets doctrine, the government
139. Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion To Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment, supra note 35, at 6 (citations omitted).
140. See generally Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and
Executive Power, POL. Sci. Q., Spring 2005, at 85.
141. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 1I n.26
(1953); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[U]nless
the very question upon which the case turns is itself a state secret, or the circumstances make clear
that sensitive military secrets will be so central to the subject matter of the litigation that any
attempt to proceed will threaten disclosure of the privileged matters, the plaintiff's case should be
allowed to proceed .... " (quoting Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241-42
(4th Cir. 1985)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 822, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (terminating suit only after
evaluating plaintiffs' nonprivileged evidence and defendant's evidence); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709
F.2d 51, 64 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (remanding where district court had dismissed case on basis of
privilege but refusing to consider if plaintiffs could make a primafacie case lacking the privileged
information).
143. Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1238 n.3.
144. Id. at 1244.
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could immunize executive action from judicial scrutiny. Separation-of-
powers principles, however, compel the conclusion that the executive
branch cannot disable, by unilateral fiat, the power of Article III courts
to be the ultimate arbiters of the law and the Constitution.1 45 The
Supreme Court has stated that "when the President takes official action,
the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the
law." '14 6 To allow the Executive to have the first and final say on the
extent of its own power flies in the face of the most basic separation-of-
powers principles.147 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rejected
claims of unilateral-executive power with respect to holding enemy
combatants in wartime and declared that "[w]hatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive" in wartime, it surely
"envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake."'1
48
As a general matter, courts are plainly competent to review cases
implicating even the most sensitive national-security issues, and have
done so routinely. In the past five years, in cases related to the same
"war on terror" that the government invokes to preclude judicial review
of the TSP, courts have decided whether the President can detain enemy
combatants captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan and whether those
captured are entitled to due process, 149 whether individuals detained at
Guantdinamo Bay can challenge their detention,150 and whether these
detainees may be subjected to trials not conforming to rules set by Con-
gress. 51 In the past, courts have determined whether the military can try
individuals detained inside and outside zones of conflict during times of
hostility and peace; 152 whether the government could prevent newspa-
145. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000) ("No doubt the political
branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution, but ever since Marbury this
Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."); Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.").
146. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); see also Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378,
401 (1932) ("What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have
been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.").
147. Jones, 520 U.S. at 699 ("The Framers 'built into the tripartite Federal Government... a
self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the
expense of the other.'") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (alteration in
original)); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322 (1946) ("[The Framers] were opposed to
governments that placed in the hands of one man the power to make, interpret and enforce the
laws.").
148. 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
149. Id. at 509-10.
150. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
151. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006).
152. E.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (court martial proceedings
in Korea); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (commissions in occupied Germany); Ex
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pers from publishing the Pentagon Papers because it would allegedly
harm national security; 153 whether the executive branch, in the name of
national security, could deny passports to members of the Communist
Party;154 whether U.S. civilians outside of the country could be tried by
court-martial;1 55 whether the President could seize the steel mills during
a labor dispute when he believed steel was needed to fight the Korean
War; 156 whether the Executive could continue to detain a loyal Japanese
American citizen under a war-related executive order;1 57 whether the
President could block southern ports and seize ships bound for Confed-
erate ports during Civil War;158 and whether the President could author-
ize the seizure of ships on the high seas in a manner contrary to an act of
Congress during a conflict with France.1 59 It would seem that if courts
were able to decide these cases, judicial review of the TSP should not be
precluded. 160
Courts have a special duty to review executive action that threatens
fundamental liberties. As Judge Cardamone recently warned, "[w]hile
everyone recognizes national security concerns are implicated when the
government investigates terrorism within our Nation's borders, such
concerns should be leavened with common sense so as not forever to
trump the rights of the citizenry under the Constitution." 161  As the
Fourth Circuit has noted, "[a] blind acceptance by the courts of the gov-
ernment's insistence on the need for secrecy ... would impermissibly
compromise the independence of the judiciary and open the door to pos-
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (German saboteurs tried by military commission); Duncan, 327
U.S. 304 (military trial of civilians in Hawaii); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)
(civilian in Indiana tried by military commission).
153. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
154. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
155. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
156. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
157. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
158. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
159. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
160. Courts also routinely handle classified evidence in criminal cases. See Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); United States v.
Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reviewing classified materials in detail). Courts
decide whether to force disclosure of national-security information in FOIA cases. See, e.g.,
Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 300 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting government's Exemption 1 claim).
And courts review classification decisions to independently determine whether information is
properly classified. See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring
de novo judicial review of pre-publication classification determinations to ensure that information
is properly classified and agency justified censorship with specificity and agency demonstrated a
rational connection between the information and the reasons for the agency's classification"); see
also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 513 n.8 (1980) (requiring judicial review of pre-
publication classification determinations).





The Supreme Court outlined the proper use of the state-secrets priv-
ilege fifty years ago in United States v. Reynolds,'63 and has not consid-
ered the doctrine in depth since then. In Reynolds, the family members
of three civilians who died in the crash of a military plane in Georgia
sued for damages.' In response to a discovery request for the flight-
accident report, the government asserted the state-secrets privilege, argu-
ing that the report contained information about secret-military equip-
ment that was being tested aboard the aircraft during the fatal flight. 165
The Reynolds Court upheld the claim of privilege over the accident
report, but did not dismiss the suit. Rather, it remanded the case for
further proceedings, explaining "[t]here is nothing to suggest that the
electronic equipment, in this case, had any causal connection with the
accident. Therefore, it should be possible for respondents to adduce the
essential facts as to causation without resort to material touching upon
military secrets."'166 On remand, the case continued with limited discov-
ery (depositions of surviving crew members) and eventually settled. 67
The privilege is "not to be lightly invoked," nor is it to be "lightly
accepted."' 168 As one court has cautioned, "the contours of the privilege
for state secrets are narrow, and have been so defined in accord with
uniquely American concerns for democracy, openness, and separation of
powers."' 1 69 Courts have recognized that the privilege is more properly
invoked on an item-by-item basis, and not with respect to overbroad'
categories of information. 170
In the majority of cases since Reynolds, courts have considered the
state-secrets privilege in response to particular discovery requests, not as
the basis for wholesale dismissal of legal claims concerning the facial
legality of a government program. Thus, the typical result of the suc-
162. In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 392 (4th Cir. 1986).
163. 345 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1953).
164. Id. at 2-3.
165. Id. at 3-4.
166. Id. at 11.
167. See Herring v. United States, No. 03-CV-5500-LDD, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18545 at *6,
*37 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2004).
168. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7, 11; see also Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 481 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
169. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated August 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); see also In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 478-79 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Because evidentiary
privileges by their very nature hinder the ascertainment of the truth, and may even torpedo it
entirely, their exercise 'should in every instance be limited to their narrowest purpose.'" (quoting
Barry A. Stulberg, Comment, State Secrets Privilege: The Executive Caprice Runs Rampant, 9
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 445, 445 n.5 (1987)); Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 480 ("[C]laims of
executive privilege ... must be narrowly construed .....
170. See, e.g., In re United States, 872 F.2d at 478.
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cessful invocation of the state-secrets privilege is simply to remove the
privileged evidence from the case but to permit the case to proceed.' 71
Outright dismissal of a suit on the basis of the privilege, and the
resultant "denial of the forum provided under the Constitution for the
resolution of disputes is a drastic remedy."1 72 Accordingly, courts have
refused to dismiss suits prematurely based on the government's unilat-
eral assertion that state secrets are necessary and relevant to adjudicating
all of the claims-particularly without first considering all non-privi-
leged evidence. 73 Similarly, courts have refused to dismiss cases based
on the privilege where the purported state secrets are not relevant or
necessary to the parties' claims or defenses or where it appears that the
parties can proceed with non-privileged evidence.1 74 Thus, courts have
171. Many courts have allowed cases to proceed in some form, and often to a merits resolution,
despite the invocation of the privilege. See, e.g., Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11 (remanding for further
discovery and normal proceedings); DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp. 245 F.3d 327, 334
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a "categorical rule mandating dismissal" whenever the government
invokes the state-secrets privilege in a litigation and remanding the case for further proceedings
after upholding a claim of privilege to quash a subpoena); Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United
States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding CIA's privilege claim in contract action
involving alleged financing of clandestine CIA activity, but remanding for further discovery
because the lower court prematurely in resolving when national security bars a valid suit);
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 66-70 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding part of privilege claim but
remanding for merits determination); Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1982)
(deciding case on merits despite prior successful claim of privilege); Attorney Gen. v. The Irish
People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding invocation of the privilege but
declining to dismiss the case); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785, 791 (4th Cir. 1968) (upholding claim
of privilege in defamation suit, but remanding for further discovery of non-privileged evidence);
Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 489, 493 (upholding part of privilege claim but going forward with decision
on the merits); see also Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 519-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(rejecting as premature pre-discovery motion to dismiss Federal Tort Claims Act suit against the
NSA on state secrets grounds); Foster v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 492 (1987) (upholding privilege
but declining to dismiss). Even in Halkin v. Helms, the court allowed the parties to fight "the bulk
of their dispute on the battlefield of discovery" and did not dismiss the case out of hand. 690 F.2d
977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
172. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted);
see also In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477 ("Dismissal of a suit [on state-secrets grounds at any
point of the litigation], and the consequent denial of a forum without giving the plaintiff her day in
court .. .is indeed draconian."); Spock, 464 F. Supp. at 519 ("An aggrieved party should not
lightly be deprived of the constitutional right to petition the. courts for relief.").
173. See, e.g., Monarch Assurance, 244 F.3d at 1364-65; In re United States, 872 F.2d at 477;
Spock, 464 F. Supp. at 519-20.
174. See, e.g., Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(reversing dismissal on the basis of the privilege where the nonprivileged record was not
sufficiently developed and the relevancy of any privileged evidence was unclear); Monarch
Assurance, 244 F.3d at 1364 (reversing dismissal on state-secrets grounds so that plaintiff could
engage in further discovery to support claim with nonprivileged evidence); Clift v. United States,
597 F.2d 826, 830 (2d Cir. 1979) (remanding for further proceedings where plaintiff has "not
conceded that without the requested documents he would be unable to proceed, however difficult
it might be to do so"); Heine, 399 F.2d at 791 (upholding claim of privilege in defamation suit, but
remanding for further discovery of non-privileged evidence).
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routinely rejected a "categorical rule mandating dismissal whenever the
state secrets privilege is validly invoked."'' 7 5
In only two cases has the Supreme Court dismissed a matter on the
pleadings. Both involved claims under alleged contracts to carry out
espionage; in both, the Court held that the very nature of such contracts
implied secrecy terms that "preclude[ ] any action for their enforce-
ment."' 76 The Supreme Court's decisions in Reynolds and Totten thus
spawned two separate doctrines: first, "the state secrets privilege, which
is an evidentiary and discovery rule that . . . is not applicable at the
pleading stage[,]" and that, when validly claimed, results only in nondis-
closure of the particular evidence sought.'7 7 Second, a public-policy
doctrine based on Totten that calls for dismissal of those very few cases
in which sensitive military secrets will be so central to the subject matter
of the case that any effort to proceed with the litigation will threaten
disclosure of privileged matters. 78
The Ninth Circuit held that the very subject matter of the actions
filed to enjoin the TSP should not be considered a state secret because
the government has publicly acknowledged, described, and defended the
challenged surveillance program.'79 The government not only acknowl-
edged the existence and scope of the TSP but engaged in an aggressive
175. DTM Research, 245 F.3d at 334.
176. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9
(2005) ("[L]awsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden.").
177. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of the Navy, No. CV-86-3292, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19034, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 1989).
178. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241-44 (4th Cir. 1985)
(characterizing the power to dismiss cases when "very subject matter" is a state secret as
"narrow"). An example is Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991).
That case arose out of an attack on a U.S. vessel in an area of conflict (the 1987 U.S.S. Stark
disaster in the Persian Gulf), and the plaintiffs' claims were directed at "design, manufacture,
performance, [and] functional characteristics" of state-of-the-art military equipment, and military
"rules of engagement." Id. at 547. Courts are traditionally hesitant to entertain claims questioning
tactical practices of the armed forces on the battlefield, and a number of immunities might well
have shielded defendants had the case not been dismissed on the pleadings. For example, the
private defendants argued that "courts should not entertain tort actions arising out of the
engagement of United States armed forces in areas of hostility" and also that dismissal was
warranted because the claims were being pursued against Iraq by the United States. See
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp 1134, 1136 & n.2 (D. Conn. 1990), affd, 935
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991).
179. A1-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he [Plaintiffs'] identities . . . were
published, yet the government continued to insist that... [they] may not identify themselves and
that their identities must still be kept secret. This is like closing the barn door after the horse has
already bolted.") (Cardamone, J., concurring); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, 463 U.S. 1303,
1306 (1983) ("[The Court] ha[s] not permitted restrictions on the publication of information that
would have been available to any member of the public .... "); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S.
507, 513 n.8 (1980) (suggesting that government would have no interest in censoring information
already "in the public domain"); Virginia Dep't of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 579
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public-relations campaign to convince the American public that the pro-
gram was both lawful and necessary to protect national security. On
January 19, 2006, the Department of Justice issued a forty-two page
White Paper discussing in detail its legal defenses and justifications for
the TSP.'8 ° Government officials publicly testified before Congress
about the legality, scope, and basis for the NSA surveillance several
times. 8' President Bush discussed and promoted the TSP at least eight
times through radio addresses, at news conferences, and at public
events.' 8 2  Vice President Cheney promoted the TSP during a com-
mencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy183 and at four separate
rallies for servicemen and servicewomen. 8 4  Administration officials
have even participated in public-web discussions in defense of the
TSP. "'85 The administration ensured that its defense of the program
received the broadest possible public exposure. Having done those
things, it should not be allowed to insulate its actions from judicial over-
sight by arguing that the very subject matter of the cases challenging the
TSP is a state secret.
In similar contexts, courts have properly rejected privilege claims
(4th Cir. 2004) (holding that government had no compelling interest in keeping information sealed
where the "information ha[d] already become a matter of public knowledge").
180. See DOJ Memo, supra note 59.
181. See Operations of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 37-40, 42-44 (2006) (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the
United States); Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, USAF, To Be the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong.
(2006); Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. of the United States);
Worldwide Terror Threat: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence and Gen. Michael
Hayden, then Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence).
182. See President's Radio Address, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 926 (May 13, 2006);
Remarks on the Terrorist Surveillance Program, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 911 (May 11,
2006); President's News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 125, 128-29 (Jan. 26, 2006);
Remarks Following a Visit to the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Maryland, 42 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 121, 122-23 (Jan. 25, 2006); Remarks on the War on Terror and a Question-
and-Answer Session in Manhattan, Kansas, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 101, 109 (Jan. 23,
2006); Remarks on the War on Terror and a Question-and-Answer Session in Louisville,
Kentucky, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 40, 46-47 (Jan. 11, 2006); President's News
Conference, supra note 1; President's Radio Address, supra note 1.
183. Vice President Richard Cheney, Commencement Address at the United States Naval
Academy (May 26, 2006).
184. Vice President Richard Cheney, Rally for the Troops at Fairchild Air Force Base (Apr.
17, 2006); Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks at a Rally for the Troops at Scott Air Force
Base (Mar. 21, 2006); Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks at a Rally for the Troops at
Charleston Air Force Base (Mar. 17, 2006); Vice President Richard Cheney, Remarks at a Rally
for the Troops at Fort Leavenworth (Jan. 6, 2006).
185. In January 2006, for example, Attorney General Gonzales conducted a web discussion-
part of the White House's online interactive forum called "Ask the White House"-where he
answered questions from members of the public regarding the NSA program. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales, supra note 15.
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over information that has already been widely publicized. In Spock, for
example, the court rejected the claim that the NSA could not admit or
deny that plaintiffs' communications had been intercepted without harm
to national security, finding that this would "reveal[ ] no important state
secret" particularly because it had already been disclosed in the Wash-
ington Post. 186 The court went on to hold that dismissal of plaintiffs'
action was wholly inappropriate "where the only disclosure in issue
[was] the admission or denial of the allegation that interception of com-
munications occurred[,] an allegation which ha[d] already received
widespread publicity the abrogation of the plaintiff's right of access to
the courts could undermine our country's historic commitment to the
rule of law."'187 Similarly, in Jabara v. Kelley, the district court
observed that where information over which the government asserted the
privilege had been revealed in a report to Congress-specifically that it
was the NSA that had intercepted plaintiffs' communications-"it
would be a farce to conclude" that information "remain[ed] a military or
state secret."
188
The focus of the challenge to the TSP is not a secret at all-the
question presented is a basic constitutional-law question that should be
decided on the basis of first principles. The two Supreme Court deci-
sions of greatest relevance to the constitutionality of the TSP, Youngs-
town and Keith, resolved similar issues of presidential power without
recourse to state secrets. In Youngstown the constitutionality of the
President's action in seizing the steel mills was considered at a funda-
mental and principled level-whether the "Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of pri-
vate property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping produc-
tion."' 189 There was no reference in the constitutional analysis to
precisely what products were produced in the factories seized, what their
importance was to national defense, what weapons and ammunition the
military in Korea had on hand, what battlefield information (secret or
otherwise) relevant to the need to produce additional munitions, how the
factories seized were operated by the government, or any other factual
details.
In Keith, the Court was able to resolve the question whether the
186. Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
187. Id. at 520.
188. 75 F.R.D. 475, 493 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see also In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 478
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting privilege claim, relying in part on prior release under the Freedom of
Information Act of information relevant to litigation); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (rejecting portion of privilege claim on ground that so much relevant information was
already public).
189. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
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President had constitutional authority to conduct electronic surveillance
of domestic threats to national security without recourse to state
secrets.' 90 The constitutional analysis was not perceived to depend on
the nature and extent of domestic threats to national security, the meth-
ods of operation available to the government short of warrantless elec-
tronic surveillance, the kind of electronic-surveillance methods available
to the government and the deployment tactics, or any similar presumably
secret matters. The Court noted the government's assertion that there
had been 1562 bombing incidents in the United States in the first half of
1971, most at government institutions, and concluded, "[t]he precise
level of this activity, however, is not relevant to the disposition of this
case."' 91 The records of the Supreme Court and the lower courts in
Youngstown and Keith are devoid of any suggestion that state secrets
were essential to the important constitutional questions decided in those
cases. 192
The Circuit Courts of Appeals in United States v. Clay,19 3 United
States v. Brown, 94 United States v. Butenko, 195 and United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung196 ruled on the President's implied power to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance in national-security cases without
access to state secrets. The government did not argue, even in the most
recent of those cases, that the question of the President's constitutional
authority could not be resolved without state-secrets information. ' 97 The
court perhaps most likely to recognize the state-secrets argument-the
FISA Court-made no reference to it, and instead simply took for
granted that the power existed. 198 The government relied on these cases
for its claim that the TSP was constitutional. The government's argu-
ment, however, both that there is persuasive precedent that such surveil-
lance was constitutional and that courts cannot decide the question
without access to state secrets that were not available in the previous
cases, is fatally inconsistent.
190. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 324 (1972).
191. Id. at 311 n.12.
192. Similarly, in Little v. Barreme, the Supreme Court required no secret information about
the particular conflict between the United States and France, or about the specific danger posed by
ships coming from France, to hold that Congress had "prescribed ... the manner in which th[e]
law shall be carried into execution." 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804). As a result of its
analysis of the text of the statute, the Court concluded that the President had no authority to seize
ships bound from France, as opposed to bound to France. Id. at 178.
193. 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
194. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
195. 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1974).
196. 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981).
197. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Humphrey, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981)
(No. 76-5176), 1979 WL 212414.
198. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
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The mere fact that a suit concerns a classified-intelligence program
does not transform the very subject matter of the suit into a state secret.
No court has ever relied on the state-secrets privilege to dismiss purely
legal claims concerning the facial validity of a government-surveillance
program. 199 Numerous cases that involve harms flowing from covert or
clandestine programs or activity have been the subject of litigation, and
often, even where the privilege is validly invoked over some evidence,
the case has been allowed to proceed in some form.2" Indeed, courts
that have considered challenges to warrantless surveillance have not
considered the very subject matter a state secret, even where the plain-
tiffs were challenging NSA surveillance.2"'
Further, numerous courts have adjudicated legal questions regard-
ing foreign-intelligence surveillance without confronting any state-
secrets problem. For example, courts have faced no evidentiary or state-
secrets obstacle in evaluating the constitutionality of FISA.2°2 Indeed,
since September 11 courts have evaluated the facial legality of govern-
ment-surveillance tools without any state-secrets issues arising and with-
out any question regarding their authority to do so.20 3 To dismiss the
199. But cf E1-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of
damages claim by alleged victim of extraordinary-rendition program).
200. See, e.g., Monarch Assurance P.L.C v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(claims involving covert CIA financing); Kronisch v. Gottlieb, No. 99-6152, 2000 WL 534301 (2d
Cir. May 2, 2000) (case involving CIA clandestine LSD program); Kronisch v. United States, 150
F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989)
(claims regarding CIA cover company); Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978)
(covert CIA mail-opening program); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968) (defamation
case involving covert CIA spies); Linder v. Calero-Portocarrero, 180 F.R.D. 168 (D.D.C. 1998)
(wrongful-death action against leaders of Nicaraguan Contra organizations); Orlikow v. United
States, 682 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1988) (claims involving CIA's covert MKULTRA program);
Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977) (CIA covert mail-opening program);
Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Haw. 1977); Barlow v. United States, 53 Fed.
Cl. 667 (2002) (whistleblower claims involving facts about CIA and nuclear-weapons
proliferation).
201. See, e.g., Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 2982) (deciding claims on the merits
even where some aspects of case were state secrets); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (remanding some claims for consideration on the merits, despite upholding privilege claims
over particular evidence); Halkin v. Helms (Halkin 1), 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978) (dismissing
claims against the NSA only after discovery and not because the very subject matter was a state
secret); Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (refusing to prematurely
dismiss claims against the NSA on the basis of the privilege); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (ruling on the privilege claims but no suggestion that the very subject matter
was a state secret).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Duggan,
743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984).
203. See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2006) (evaluating
constitutionality of the national-security-letter power in counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence
investigations); Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, 449 F.3d 415 (2d
Cir. 2006) (same).
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cases challenging the TSP on the ground that the very subject matter is
an alleged state secret would produce a perverse result: Where Congress,
by statute, authorizes the Executive to engage in foreign-intelligence
gathering, courts may review its legality and constitutionality; but where
the Executive secretly violates limits placed by Congress on eavesdrop-
ping, a court would be powerless to opine on its legality.2°
204. It is also possible to argue that in enacting FISA, Congress abrogated the state-secrets
privilege as a bar to the litigation of claims respecting illegal electronic surveillance. This
argument was made by both the AI-Haramain plaintiffs, Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 507
F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007), and in Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 28,
Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-313 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 2006.) In Al-
Haramain, the Ninth Circuit remanded the question to the District Court, which had not reached
this issue in its original opinion. 507 F.3d at 1205-06. The argument is based on the fact that
Congress created a civil cause of action for violations of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1810, and a procedure
governing review of the propriety of the process by which a FISA order was sought, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1806(f). The latter section makes clear that a judge may look past executive affidavits and
scrutinize the underlying evidence "relating to the surveillance" in determining whether a
disclosure of such information would harm the national security:
[The court] shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an
affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national
security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order,
and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to
determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized
and conducted.
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2000); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048; S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 64 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3973, 4033 ("The conmittee views the procedures set forth in [§ 1806(f)] as striking a reasonable
balance between an entirely in camera proceeding... and mandatory disclosure .... "). The D.C.
Circuit has suggested that this procedure under § 1806(f) may also be used in suits under FISA's
civil-damages-action provision, 50 U.S.C. § 1810. See ACLU Found. of So. Cal. v. Barr, 952
F.2d 457, 470 (1991) ("Congress also anticipated that issues regarding the legality of FISA-
authorized surveillance would arise in civil proceedings and . . . it empowered federal district
courts to resolve those issues .... ).
Congress's creation of a specific cause of action for a FISA violation necessarily
contemplates judicial review of actions taken by the government in violation of FISA. The
Second Circuit recognized as much in an opinion holding that the state-secrets privilege was
waived with relation to litigation brought under an act allowing an inventor to seek compensation
for patents kept secret owing to military necessity:
The assertion by the United States of its privilege with respect to state secrets is, we
think, governed by similar considerations. Congress has created rights which it has
authorized federal district courts to try. Inevitably, by their very nature, the trial of
cases involving patent applications placed under a secrecy order will always involve
matters within the scope of this privilege. Unless Congress has created rights which
are completely illusory, existing only at the mercy of government officials, the act
[authorizing such claims] must be viewed as waiving the privilege.
Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1958). By creating causes of action against the
government-even going so far as to allow civil-damages claims-in circumstances that would
"by their very nature . . . always involve matters within the scope of this privilege" as the
government might colorably assert it, Congress acknowledged that the federal courts may
entertain actions under FISA, waiving or abrogating the common-law state-secrets privilege with
respect to such claims. Id.; see also Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998).
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In the litigation over the TSP, the disclosure of state secrets is not
necessary to resolve any of the significant issues on the merits. The
government admitted that it was engaging in warrantless surveillance
covered by FISA and therefore was not following the requirements of
the statute. The government offered only one defense to plaintiffs' stat-
utory claim-namely that Congress, through the AUMF, authorized the
President to engage in warrantless wiretapping of Americans on Ameri-
can soil. That defense posed a purely legal question: Does one statute,
the AUMF, trump two other statutes, FISA and 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(f),
which provide that FISA and Title III are the exclusive means for wire-
tapping Americans?
The government's AUMF defense of its actions turns on statutory
construction, not facts-privileged or otherwise. The government
devoted the bulk of its forty-two-page memorandum to Congress to
arguing this precise point-presumably without disclosing any state
secrets. Whether Congress intended the general AUMF to repeal the
very specific FISA requirements is a purely legal question. That legal
question is controlled by the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. °5
State secrets are also unnecessary to judicial review of the claim
that the President exceeded his authority and violated the separation of
powers by intruding on Congress's prerogatives. The government con-
tended that the courts cannot resolve the legal and constitutional ques-
tions concerning the TSP without a plethora of facts about the specific
nature of the al Qaeda threat, the scope of the program, and the opera-
tional details of the surveillance-all of which, it argued, are subject to
the state-secrets privilege.
The government suggested that state secrets about "the specific
threat facing the Nation and the particular actions taken by the President
to meet that threat" would support its claim of inherent authority and
provide a valid defense to plaintiffs' claims. 20 6 But the President has no
authority to violate the law, no matter what his motivations may be, and
no matter what kind of threat or emergency is posed. The Constitution
does not grant the President any emergency powers to ignore the law. In
Youngstown, Justice Jackson wisely recognized that the Framers were
not unaware of emergencies, and yet provided no general relief from
constitutional constraints when they occur:
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inherent
powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many
think would be wise, although it is something the forefathers omitted.
They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engen-
205. See supra, Part II, for the discussion of Hamdan.
206. Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 138, at 3.
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der for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pre-
text for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected that
emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies. Aside from
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of
rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require it, they
made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary authority
because of a crisis. I do not think we rightfully may so amend their
work .... 207
The question of the President's constitutional authority must first
be resolved by resort to principles, not by analysis of the facts of a spe-
cific threat at a specific point in time. As Justice Jackson noted in
Youngstown, "[t]he opinions of judges, no less than executives and pub-
licists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power's
validity with the cause it is invoked to promote .... The tendency is
strong to emphasize transient results upon policies ... and lose sight of
enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our
Republic. 208
V. TiH IMPACT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
COURT ORDERS IN JANUARY 2007
Shortly before the oral argument before the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in ACLU v. NSA, 2° the government announced that President
Bush would not reauthorize the TSP because the government had suc-
ceeded in obtaining an order under FISA allowing similar surveillance to
be conducted under the Act.2 10 Attorney General Gonzales advised the
Senate Judiciary Committee:
[O]n January 10, 2007, a Judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court issued orders authorizing the Government to target for
collection international communications into or out of the United
States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the com-
municants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist
organization. As a result of these orders, any electronic surveillance
that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance Program will
now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. 1
The Attorney General claimed that the government had been exploring
the possibility of conducting the surveillance through the FISA Court
207. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 649-50 (1952) (footnotes
omitted).
208. Id. at 634
209. 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
210. Gonzales Letter, supra note 34.
211. Id. para. 1.
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even before the existence of the program had been made public. He
stated, "[t]hese orders are innovative, they are complex, and it took con-
siderable time and work for the Government to develop the approach
that was proposed to the Court and for the Judge on the FISC to consider
and approve these orders. 21 2 He concluded by stating that "the Presi-
dent has determined not to reauthorize the Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram when the current authorization expires.
2 1 3
The orders signed by the FISA Court were not made public. Nor
was there ever any public explanation of what was "innovative" or
"complex" about the orders, nor why the government could not have
taken that approach from the beginning.214 The government did not
explain whether the "innovative" approach deviated in any way from the
requirements of the FISA statute.
The government subsequently contended that as a result of the
FISA Court orders, the various legal challenges seeking an injunction
against the TSP were moot. But the plaintiffs in those actions claimed
that their cases were not moot because of the doctrine that a party may
not evade judicial review of questionable conduct by voluntarily ceasing
such conduct during review.21 5 To guard against intentional avoidance
of judicial review, the cases hold that the party asserting mootness bears
the heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct
cannot reasonably be expected to start up again.2 t6 The "stringent" bur-
den on a party asserting mootness is to show that "subsequent events
ma[k]e it absolutely clear that the alleged wrongful behavior [can] not
reasonably be expected to recur."
217
The government must have recognized that it could not possibly
meet this heavy burden, given that it continued to insist that the TSP had
been (and continued to be) entirely legal, that the President might
reauthorize it in the event that the FISA Court orders were not
renewed,2t8 and that he might indeed opt out of the regime created by
212. Id. para. 2.
213. Id. para. 3.
214. In January 2006 the President claimed that it was not possible to conduct this program
under the old law (referring to FISA). President's News Conference, supra note 182, at 133.
215. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
174 (2000) ("A defendant's voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct ordinarily does not
suffice to moot a case."); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)
(same). Otherwise, a party would be free to resume the conduct after a challenge was dismissed
as moot, as courts would be compelled to leave the defendant "free to return to his old ways."
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (quoting United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
216. See Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203.
217. Id.; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738,
2751 (2007) ("heavy burden"); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190 ("formidable burden").
218. In Parents Involved, the Supreme Court relied on the facts that the Seattle School District,
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the new FISA orders at any time he pleases.
Attorney General Gonzales testified before Congress that his
"belief is that the actions taken by the administration, by this president,
were lawful, in the past. ' 219  Indeed, notwithstanding the government's
implication that the program is no longer in effect because it was
allowed to lapse without being reauthorized, the government asserts the
right to carry out surveillance under the terms of the program challenged
in this lawsuit at any time. ° In fact, the government has claimed that
the President not only has the right to carry out such surveillance outside
of FISA under the proper circumstances, but that he has the duty to do
so.2 1 In several colloquies at oral argument before the Sixth Circuit, the
government agreed with questions suggesting that it could in fact opt out
of the FISA Court orders at any time, or indeed conduct surveillance
outside of FISA even while the FISA Court orders were in effect.22 In
every respect, then, it appears that the decision to let the NSA Program's
a governmental body, "vigorously defends the constitutionality" of the school-assignment
program it had ceased using, "and nowhere suggests that if this litigation is resolved in its favor it
will not resume" the challenged practice. 127 S. Ct. at 2751. Both factors were present with
respect to the TSP.
219. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice: S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38
(2007); see also Gonzales Letter, supra note 34, para. 3 ("[A]s we have previously explained, the
Terrorist Surveillance Program fully complies with the law ....").
220. See Tony Snow, Press Sec'y, White House, Press Briefing (Jan. 17, 2007) (Q: "... the
President has always argued that-I mean, he has the ability, he has the authority not to use FISA
to get authority" . . . White House Spokesman Snow: "Yes, and he still believes that."), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/0l/20070ll7-5.html; Government's Reply in
Support of Its Supplemental Submission Discussing the Implications of the Intervening FISA
Court Orders of January 10, 2007 at 5, ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
No. 07-468, 2008 WL 423556, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008) (No. 06-2095) ("[T]he President has not
disavowed his authority to reauthorize the TSP in the event that the FISA court orders are not
renewed .... "); Proposed FISA Modernization Legislation: Hearing of the S. Select Comm. on
Intelligence (May 1, 2007) (Sen. Feingold: "Can each of you assure the American people that
there is not ... and will not be any more surveillance in which the FISA process is side-stepped
based on arguments that the president has independent authority under Article II or the
authorization of the use of military force? / Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell:
"Sir, the president's authority under Article II is-are in the Constitution. So if the president
chose to exercise Article II authority, that would be the president's call.").
221. See, e.g., Memorandum of Points and Authorities, supra note 138, at 30, 38 (noting that
the President's most important power is the obligation to protect the U.S., that the President
determined that the FISA process did failed under the current threat, and that this judgment fell
within the President's powers).
222. ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 693-720 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, No. 07-468, 2008 WL 423556, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2008); see also Audio File: Oral
Argument of ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://
www.ca6.uscourts.govlintemet/06_2095/06-2095.mp3 at 18'45" (Judge Gillman: "But (you can]
opt out of the FISA regime whenever you decide to, couldn't you? The FISA court hasn't
restrained you from doing that." The Government attorney Coppolino: "That's absolutely true,
Your Honor .... ); id. at 19'53" (Judge Batchelder: "Those aren't the only possibilities. I mean,
the possibility also exists, theoretically, at least, that the FISA court would be perfectly willing to
reauthorize but that the Executive would nevertheless decide to conduct some surveillance outside
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authorization lapse was a matter of executive grace, and that a decision
to revive it might have been taken at any time as a matter of executive
discretion.
Given that both the TSP and FISA orders are secret, the plaintiffs in
the various lawsuits, those who communicate with them, and the public
would have no way of knowing whether and when FISA orders expire or
if the President reauthorizes non-FISA surveillance.
The government argued that the mootness issue should not be ana-
lyzed under the voluntary-cessation argument, but rather under the
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness.223 In
that event, the government's "formidable burden" of showing that it is
"absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasona-
bly be expected to recur, "224 would disappear, and instead there would
be a burden on the plaintiffs in the cases to demonstrate a probability
that the same controversy would recur involving the same party. Given
the parallels between this case and the voluntary-cessation cases, it was
the plaintiffs who had the better of this argument.
VI. WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The 2007 Amendments to FISA
In August 2007 FISA was amended to give congressional approval
to warrantless electronic surveillance for foreign threats to national
security. The new legislation dramatically changed the previous statute
and departs from the ordinary requirements imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. First, the scope of FISA was limited in a new section
105A by excluding from the definition of "electronic surveillance" gov-
erned by the statute, "surveillance directed at a person reasonably
believed to be located outside of the United States. 225 Second, a new
procedure for conducting surveillance and acquiring information "con-
cerning" persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States was
created in a new section 105B.226
Under § 1805b(a), the Director of National Intelligence (the
the FISA court jurisdiction and parameters." Coppolino: "That is true, Your Honor. That is a
hypothetical possibility ....").
223. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 483 F.3d 984, 989 (9th Cir. 2007); Native Vill.
of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1994).
224. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)
(quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
225. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (2007) (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805a).
226. Id. § 2, 121 Stat. at 552 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b).
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"Director") and the Attorney General are authorized to gather "foreign
intelligence information" concerning persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States for a period of up to one year if certain condi-
tions are met.227 The law requires the Director and the Attorney General
to find that there are reasonable procedures in place for determining that
the subjects of the surveillance are reasonably believed to be outside the
United States and provides that the procedures are subject to review by
the FISC.228  The acquisition may not constitute "electronic surveil-
lance. ' ' 229 The acquisition must involve obtaining foreign-intelligence
information from or with the assistance of a communications-service
provider or other person who has access to communications (either
while they are transmitted or stored), or to equipment that may be used
to transmit or store communications. A "significant purpose" of the
acquisition must be to obtain foreign-intelligence information.23 °
Finally, minimization procedures that meet the definition of § 1801(h)
of FISA must be used. 31 The Director and the Attorney General must
make a written certification under oath that these conditions are met
before taking action, unless immediate action is required and time does
not permit preparation of the certification. In that event, the certification
must be prepared within seventy-two hours.232
Unlike the particularity requirement imposed by the Fourth Amend-
ment,233 the certification "is not required to identify the specific facili-
ties, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information will be directed. '2 34 The certification must be
filed "as soon as practicable" with the FISC.235
The Director and the Attorney General may direct private-commu-
nications personnel to cooperate with them in acquiring information and
maintaining the secrecy of the acquisition.236 In the event that private
parties refuse to cooperate with the government, the Director and the
Attorney General may seek a court order requiring cooperation, which
227. Id.
228. Id. As explained infra, this review was not likely to occur unless the act is renewed
beyond its original 180-day sunset.
229. Id. This provision seems tautological, inasmuch as the statute defines persons reasonably
believed to be outside the United States as beyond the reach of electronic surveillance.
230. Id. § 2, 121 Stat. at 553 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
234. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552, 553 (to be codified





the court must issue if the directive was issued pursuant to the statute
and is otherwise lawful.237 Failure to comply with such an order is pun-
ishable as a contempt of court.2 38 The recipient of such an order may
challenge it by filing a petition with the FISA Court, but the order will
not be set aside if it meets the requirements of the statute and is not
"otherwise unlawful. 2 39
The submission by the Director and the Attorney General to the
FISA Court of the procedures for determining that subjects of surveil-
lance are outside the United States is not due for 120 days after the
effective date of the Act.2 4° The FISA Court is granted 180 days from
the effective date of the Act to complete its review of the procedures.2 4 ,
The Director and the Attorney General determine whether the proce-
dures are reasonably designed to ensure that the subject of surveillance
is reasonably believed to be outside the United States. 42 The FISA
Court's review is limited to determining whether the judgment of the
Director and the Attorney General is clearly erroneous.243 If the Court
finds that the determination was clearly erroneous, the government has
an additional thirty days to amend the procedures. 24 In addition, the
government could appeal an adverse decision of the FISA Court to the
Court of Review and petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Acquisitions of information may continue while appeals are pending.24 5
The August 2007 version of the Act provides that the amendments
made by the Act will cease to have effect 180 days after the effective
date of the Act, provided that any authorizations made under the Act
may continue until their termination. 246  The latter provision would
237. Id. § 2, 121 Stat. at 554 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805b).
238. Id.
239. Id. The recipient of the order may further appeal to the Court of Review and petition for a
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id.






246. Id. § 6, 121 Stat. at 557 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 note). At the time of this
writing the August 2007 amendments have been temporarily extended while Congress debates the
terms of a new bill to authorize the continuation of this surveillance. It is not possible at this time
to determine to what extent the criticisms made here of the 2007 amendments will be relevant to
the new legislation. It appears, however, that the version of the pending bill adopted by the House
of Representatives has corrected several of the most egregious problems in the 2007 amendments.
See H.R. 3773, 110th Cong. (as passed by House, Mar. 14, 2008). One significant issue under
debate at the time of this writing is whether telecommunications companies will receive
retroactive immunity for their participation in the TSP. The ongoing developments with respect to
this legislation are closely monitored on the ACLU's website: http://www.aclu.org/safefree/
general/ 7321 res20030408.html.
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extend the effective sunset of the Act for an additional year. Given the
180-day sunset provision, it seems that the amendment for review by the
FISA Court of the procedures established by the Director and the Attor-
ney General is not likely to have any meaning unless the Act is
extended.
The new procedures thus permit the acquisition of "foreign intelli-
gence information" of persons reasonably believed to be outside the
United States without any court order. "Foreign intelligence informa-
tion" is defined by the original FISA enactment.247 The definition is
extremely broad. Despite particular references to violent attacks against
the United States, the statute is drafted in the disjunctive to include
"information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that
relates to . .. (b) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
States. '248 Given that definition, there would seem to be no limitation
on warrantless surveillance aimed at gathering commercial, financial, or
even sports and entertainment information if it would affect the conduct
of the foreign affairs of the United States.
B. The Original Terrorist Surveillance Program Under
the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment imposes an independent limit on the power
of the government to engage in electronic surveillance without a judicial
warrant. No theory of implied-executive power asserts that the Presi-
dent can take actions that are proscribed by explicit provisions of the
constitution.
As the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. United States
District Court (Keith), private, confidential communications are pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, and are essential to the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms of speech, association, and petition.249 The
warrant and probable-cause requirements serve to protect both privacy
247. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2000) defines "foreign intelligence information" as:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect against-
(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power;
(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power; or
(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network
of a foreign power or by an agent of a foreign power; or
(2) information with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory that relates to,
and if concerning a United States person is necessary to-
(A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or
(B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
248. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(2).
249. 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972).
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and speech interests. The Court recognized that First and Fourth
Amendment rights are the most likely to be imperiled in national secur-
ity cases:
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of
First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary'
crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be
stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitu-
tionally protected speech.... History abundantly documents the ten-
dency of Government-however benevolent and benign its
motives-to view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute its
policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary
when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of
unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent
is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a con-
cept as the power to protect 'domestic security.' Given the difficulty
of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in act-
ing to protect that interest becomes apparent.25°
Keith held that probable cause and a warrant were required for elec-
tronic surveillance authorized by the Attorney General, on behalf of the
President, of domestic persons who allegedly constituted a threat to the
national security. The Keith Court recognized that exceptions to the
warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated, 251
and it refused to accept the government's argument that the circum-
stances of domestic-security surveillances constituted grounds to estab-
lish a new exception for such cases. The Court specifically rejected the
government's arguments that requiring prior judicial review would
obstruct the President in the exercise of his duty to protect national
security; that such surveillance was exempt from the Fourth Amendment
because it was directed primarily to collecting and maintaining intelli-
gence with respect to subversive forces and not for criminal prosecu-
tions; that the warrant requirement was not intended to restrain ongoing
intelligence gathering as compared to criminal investigations; that courts
would not have sufficiently sophisticated knowledge or techniques to
assess whether such surveillance was necessary to protect national
security; and that disclosures to judicial officers would compromise the
security of informants and agents and the secrecy necessary for intelli-
gence gathering.252
The Keith Court explicitly did not decide whether the Constitution
forbids warrantless electronic surveillance of foreign powers or their
agents in national-security cases. But its reasoning nonetheless strongly
250. Id. (citation omitted).
251. Id. at 318 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
252. Id. at 318-20.
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supports the conclusion that a warrant is required for electronic surveil-
lance of foreign agents as well.
The requirement that a neutral, disinterested magistrate be involved
in the process of instituting surveillance reflects the basic constitutional
premise that executive officers cannot be trusted to police themselves
where the privacy rights of individuals are concerned. 253 The "indis-
criminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens" that the
Keith Court rightly feared are no less likely simply because the targets of
such surveillance are suspected of being affiliated with a foreign
power.254 There is no reason that the executive's institutional tendency
to undervalue privacy and err on the side of intrusions should be dimin-
ished where the targets of the investigation are suspected of being for-
eign agents; if anything, executive officers can be expected to err in
favor of surveillance even more markedly when investigating threats
they believe to be foreign, because the officers may not believe Ameri-
cans' rights are at stake. Relying on NSA-shift supervisors to safeguard
the privacy rights of Americans resurrects the precise evil against which
the Fourth Amendment was directed by "plac[ing] the liberty of every
man in the hands of every petty officer. '255
The principal rationale advanced by the administration for squaring
the TSP with the Fourth Amendment is unpersuasive. The Justice
Department contended that the TSP can be justified under a line of
Fourth Amendment cases permitting searches without warrants and
probable cause in order to further "special needs" above and beyond
ordinary law enforcement 6.25  The Supreme Court has recognized, how-
ever, that "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to sub-
stitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. '"257
The Court has used the special-needs doctrine to uphold highway
drunk-driving checkpoints, finding them reasonable because they are
standardized, the stops are very brief and only minimally intrusive, and a
warrant and probable-cause requirement would defeat the purpose of
253. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59 ("[B]ypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a
search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations 'only in the discretion of the
police."' (citation omitted)); Keith, 497 U.S. at 317 ("The Fourth Amendment contemplates a
prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised."
(footnote omitted)).
254. Keith, 497 U.S. at 321.
255. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (quoting James Otis's description of the
British writs of assistance in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
256. DOJ Memo, supra note 59, at 37-41.
257. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985).
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keeping drunk drivers off the road.258 Similarly, the Court has upheld
school drug-testing programs under the special-needs doctrine, finding
them reasonable because students have diminished expectations of pri-
vacy in school, the programs are limited to students engaging in extra-
curricular programs (so students have advance notice and the choice to
opt out), and the drug testing is standardized and tests only for the pres-
ence of drugs.259
The TSP had none of the safeguards found critical to upholding
special-needs searches in these contexts. All the special-needs cases
contain certain elements: impracticability of the warrant or probable-
cause requirement; standardized testing or notice or an opportunity not
to participate in the test-invoking activity or both; and most signifi-
cantly, a minimal intrusion on privacy because the search takes place in
a setting where expectations of privacy are reduced (because it involves
either students in a secondary school, voluntary participation in certain
activities, probation, a high security and highly regulated job).26° Unlike
a minimally intrusive brief stop on a highway or a urine test, the TSP
consisted of wiretapping telephone and e-mail communications-
searches of a sort the Supreme Court has found to be among the most
intrusive available to the government.26 The TSP was not standardized,
258. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
259. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
260. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327 (students in secondary school); Acton, 515 U.S. at 648
(voluntary participation in certain activities); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002)
(same); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S 868 (1987) (probation); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S.
112 (2001) (same); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (high
security and highly regulated job); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(same).
261. Electronic eavesdropping "[b]y its very nature.., involves an intrusion on privacy that is
broad in scope." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967). It therefore bears a dangerous
"similarity to the general warrants out of which our Revolution sprang." Id. at 64 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Indeed, "[flew threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of
eavesdropping devices." Id. at 63 (majority opinion). Unlike physical search warrants allowing
for one limited intrusion, the Berger court found that the New York wiretapping statute at issue
allowed "the equivalent of a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single
showing of probable cause." Id. at 59. Any number of conversations might be seized, "over a
prolonged and extended period[,]" with any number of parties eavesdropped upon even if only one
is the target of the surveillance. Id. at 57. The statute allowed "no termination date on the
eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seized." Id. at 59-60. And "because [wiretapping's]
success depends on secrecy, [the statute had] no requirement for notice" of a wiretap order. Id. at
60.
For all these reasons the Berger Court implied that lawful electronic-surveillance orders
would have to adhere to judicially supervised safeguards to minimize the impact of the
surveillance on privacy-including limits on duration of the surveillance, and some form of
showing that no other, less-intrusive means were available that might allow law enforcement to
acquire the same information. Id. ("Such a showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice would
appear more important in eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when
conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized."). Congress recognized the
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but subject to discretionary targeting under a standard and process that
remain secret. Those whose privacy is intruded on had no notice or
choice to opt out of the surveillance. And it was neither limited to the
environment of a school nor analogous to a brief stop for a few seconds
at a highway checkpoint.
Unless the Supreme Court was prepared to expand the scope of the
special-needs exception beyond the sorts of cases to which it was previ-
ously applied, the TSP should be considered as unconstitutional under
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
There is no greater need for state secrets to resolve the constitu-
tional question under the Fourth Amendment with respect to the TSP
than there was in Keith, where the Court held warrantless electronic sur-
veillance of domestic threats to national security unconstitutional with-
out regard to state secrets.262 In Ellsberg v. Mitchell, the D.C. Circuit
rejected the government's argument that state secrets necessarily pre-
vented the government from arguing that there was a foreign-intelli-
gence exception to the warrant requirement. The court stated that there
was "no reason to relieve those who authorize and conduct [warrantless
foreign-intelligence taps] of the burden of showing that they come
within the exemption. 26 3 As the court explained,
In many such situations, the government would be able (as it has
been here) to refuse to disclose any details of the circumstances sur-
rounding the surveillance by invoking its state secrets privilege. The
result would be to deny the plaintiffs access to all of the information
they need to dispute the government's characterization of the nature
and purpose of the surveillance. And the net effect would be to
immunize, not only all wiretaps legitimately falling within the
hypothesized "foreign agent" exemption, but all other surveillance
conducted with equipment or under circumstances sufficiently sensi-
tive to permit assertion of the state secrets privilege. We find such
consequences unacceptable.2"
In fact, the court went on to note that such a consequence "might call
into question the very existence of the foreign agent exception. ' 265
constitutional dimension of these minimization requirements in both Title III and FISA. See 50
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(5) (2000) (mandating that applications and orders under FISA include a
statement of proposed minimization procedures).
262. The Court in Keith did note the government's assertion, apparently based on non-secret
information, that there had been 1562 bombing incidents in the United States in the first six
months of 1971, most at government facilities, but concluded that the precise level of that activity
was "not relevant to the disposition of this case." United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407
U.S. 297, 311 n.12 (1972).
263. 709 F.2d 51, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1983).




Accordingly, because the defendants had not yet made any showing
regarding the existence and application of any foreign-intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement, the court refused to dismiss those
claims and remanded to the district court. The court noted that the
remaining questions were primarily "questions of law" that could be
resolved in camera if necessary.266
C. The 2007 Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment
The 2007 amendments to FISA eliminated any argument that Con-
gress has not authorized the President to conduct the surveillance of
communications contemplated by the statute without a warrant. The
President is now acting in Justice Jackson's first category in his Youngs-
town concurrence, under an express authorization by Congress, where
presidential authority is at its maximum. 267 As a practical matter, the
only serious remaining question about the legality of the program is
whether it complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The question whether FISA is constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment brings the inquiry back to primacy of the warrant require-
ment discussed at length in Keith. Throughout the controversy over the
NSA warrantless electronic surveillance, the government argued that the
essential Fourth Amendment requirement is that a search be "reasona-
ble," not whether it is conducted pursuant to a warrant.268 But this argu-
ment ignores the teaching of Keith, that "'reasonableness' derives
content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause. ' 269 Keith
explicitly rejected the argument that reasonableness was a substitute for
a judicial warrant:
Some have argued that "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is reason-
able to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasona-
ble[.]" This view, however, overlooks the second clause of the
Amendment. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not
dead language. Rather, it has been
"a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it
has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in
courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be
266. Id. at 69-70; see also Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1982)
("[D]efendants had divulged the interception and later transmittal to the FBI .... Thus .. . the
state secret privilege was no impediment to the adjudication of [plaintiffs] fourth amendment
claim."); Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (upholding Attorney General's
claim of privilege, and pointing out afterward that the "matter ha[d] not ended" because the court
still had to determine "whether the warrantless electronic surveillances ... compl[ied] with the
commands of the Fourth Amendment").
267. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952).
268. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 300 (1972).
269. Id. at 309-10 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473-84 (1971)).
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somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency.
It is, or should be, an important working part of our
machinery of government, operating as a matter of course
to check the 'well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous
executive officers' who are a part of any system of law
enforcement. 2
70
The Court noted that the argument that reasonableness was the test "has
not been accepted."' 27' The Court quoted Chimel v. California, where
the Court had concluded that the argument was "founded on little more
than a subjective view regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of
police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to Fourth Amendment
interests" and, that "[u]nder such an unconfined analysis, Fourth
Amendment protection in this area would approach the evaporation
point. 272
Notwithstanding the government's arguments in the NSA-surveil-
lance cases and elsewhere, Keith's insistence on the primacy of the war-
rant requirement is still the law.27 3 Although there are exceptions to the
warrant requirement, they continue to be "few in number and carefully
delineated. 274
The argument that an inquiry into reasonableness has supplanted
the warrant requirement is based on isolated references to reasonable-
ness in cases dealing with exceptions to the warrant requirement.275 In
Illinois v. McArthur, for example, the Court stated that the "central
requirement" of the Fourth Amendment is "one of reasonableness. 2 76 It
further stated that the rules and regulations established to enforce that
requirement "[s]ometimes . . . require warrants. 2 77 In the same case,
however, the Court made it clear that in "the ordinary case" seizures are
"unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without
more, unless.., accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant, issued by a
270. Id. at 315-16 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481).
271. Id. at 315 n.16 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969)).
272. 395 U.S. at 764-65.
273. See Ronald M. Gould & Simon Stern, Catastrophic Threats and the Fourth Amendment,
77 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 785 (2004) ("In a long series of cases, however, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that almost all searches and seizures require a prior warrant issued with probable
cause, and that law enforcement may act without a warrant only in certain circumstances that have
been defined categorically and narrowly.").
274. 407 U.S. at 318 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
275. The government made such arguments in Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush in their
initial brief in support of its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Memorandum of Points
and Authorities, supra note 138.




neutral magistrate after finding probable cause. ' 27 8  The Court then
described searches and seizures conducted without warrants in the face
of "special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy,
minimal intrusions, or the like" as "exceptions to the warrant require-
ment." '279 The Court ultimately held that no warrant was necessary to
detain McArthur and prevent him from entering his home while they
sought a warrant to search it for drugs, because of the exigent circum-
stances presented by the risk that he would destroy the evidence if he
entered the home alone. In the face of the exigent-circumstances argu-
ment, the Court declined to find the seizure per se unreasonable, and
proceeded to balance the privacy-related and law-enforcement-related
competing concerns to determine whether the officers' actions were rea-
sonable.28° The Court did not, however, abandon the warrant require-
ment as the threshold inquiry.
That the "central requirement" of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ableness comes from Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
Texas v. Brown.28 ' A majority of the Justices wrote concurring opinions
criticizing the understated role afforded the warrant requirement in the
282Rehnquist opinion.
As recently as last term, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the
Court continued to analyze a search under the "warrant requirement,"
noting that it is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
278. Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 331. The cases relied on for this balancing approach in McArthur involved vehicle
stops. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (random spot checks of vehicles on road
are not constitutional); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (roving border
patrol stops not constitutional in absence of reasonable suspicion). In Prouse, the Court noted that
"the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment generally requires that prior to a search a neutral
and detached magistrate ascertain that the requisite standard is met." 440 U.S. at 654 n.l 1.
281. 460 U.S. at 739.
282. Justices Powell and Blackmun did not join the plurality opinion because it "appear[ed] to
accord less significance to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment than is justified by the
language and purpose of that Amendment." Id. at 744 (Powell, J., concurring). Their opinion
cites the numerous Supreme Court opinions emphasizing that exceptions to the warrant
requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated." Id. at 745 (quoting Keith, 407 at 318)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But they also note that "the opinions of this Court in Warrant
Clause cases have not always been consistent. They have reflected disagreement among Justices
as to the extent to which the Clause defines the reasonableness standard of the Amendment." Id.
at 745.
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall also concurred, for the reason that the plurality
opinion had given "inadequate consideration" to the warrant requirement. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Stevens concluded that "the Warrant Clause embodies our government's
historical commitment to bear the burden of inconvenience. Exigent circumstances must be
shown before the Constitution will entrust an individual's privacy to the judgment of a single
police officer." Id. at 750.
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searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable. '283 The Court did not supplant the warrant requirement
with a general balancing test for reasonableness.
In Keith, Justice Powell emphasized the historical provenance of
the warrant requirement, referencing Lord Mansfield's decision in 1765
that warrants for seditious libel must name the person to be arrested, and
not leave the decision of who should be arrested to the judgment of the
arresting officer.284 He concluded that:
Lord Mansfield's formulation touches the very heart of the Fourth
Amendment directive: that, where practical, a governmental search
and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather
evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the
collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen's pri-
vate premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is
its issuance by a "neutral and detached magistrate."28
The Court in Keith rejected the argument that the president could unilat-
erally authorize surveillance in domestic national-security cases, con-
cluding, "[T]he Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive
officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. 2 86
This is based on the "historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment
accepts... that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to
pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential inva-
sions of privacy and protected speech." '87
The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy for
the benefits that ensuring a realm of private life brings. The develop-
ment of personality that is possible when one is able to live unobserved
by government watchers and the exchange of ideas and emotions that is
possible when one can communicate with others without observation by
government agents are examples of these benefits. The benefits of pro-
tecting privileged communications are familiar to all lawyers. The bene-
fits accrue only where there is confidence that one's privacy is as
protected as possible, as inviolate as the Constitution and laws permit.
283. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that the "ultimate touchstone" of the Fourth
Amendment was reasonableness and hence there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id.
284. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) (citing Leach v. Three
of the King's Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001, 1027 (K.B. 1765)).
285. Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967)).
286. Id. at 317.
287. Id.; see also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) ("The right of
privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of
crime and the arrest of individuals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police
acting on their own cannot be trusted.").
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The particularity requirement, for example, is designed to limit govern-
ment intrusions into private spaces (now understood to include conver-
sations) and to permit searching or surveillance of conversations only
where evidence or fruits of crime or unprivileged conversations with
foreign agents will be discovered. Cognizant of these limitations, a free
person is entitled to confidence that private spaces and communications
that fall outside the government's permitted zone of search and observa-
tion will remain private.
This is why the scope of Fourth Amendment protections is based
on "reasonable expectation of privacy." '288 It is noteworthy that this con-
cept was first articulated in Katz, an electronic-surveillance case. As the
Court concluded, "a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not
be broadcast to the world." '289 It is the ability to rely on the protection of
the Fourth Amendment, to assume that one is not being overheard, that
is significant, because in the absence of that reliance one cannot feel free
to express private thoughts.
The 2007 amendments to FISA pose an even weaker argument for
application of the special-needs exception to the warrant requirement
than did the TSP. To justify an exception to the warrant requirement for
special needs, the solution must be a "reasonably effective" means for
addressing the problem that justifies recourse to the exception. 290 The
courts have not required that the means chosen are the least-restrictive
alternative to solving the problem and have afforded some measure of
discretion to the judgment of law-enforcement officials. 291 Nonetheless,
there is, as Justice Ginsburg put it, "a difference between imperfect tai-
loring and no tailoring at all."292
The 2007 FISA amendments permit the warrantless electronic sur-
veillance of any person reasonably believed to be outside the United
States for the purpose of gathering foreign-intelligence information. As
described above, this includes any "information with respect to a foreign
power that relates to . . . the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United
288. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 352 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
290. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995) (analyzing the "efficacy of th[e] means" for meeting the
problem); Gould & Stem, supra note 273, at 826-28.
291. See, e.g., Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453-54 (1990) ("[F]or
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among such reasonable alternatives remains
with the governmental offices who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for,
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.").
292. Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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States. '293 The purported justification for warrantless surveillance under
the FISA amendments is the protection of the United States from ter-
rorists, principally al Qaeda and its supporters. A statute that permits
conversations between any person abroad with information that relates
to the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs and a citizen of the United States
within this country to be overheard without a judicial warrant is simply
not a "reasonably effective" means of addressing the terrorism problem.
The breadth of the 2007 FISA amendments disqualifies them from com-
ing within the special-needs exception to the warrant requirement.
The 2007 FISA amendments also fail to comply with Fourth
Amendment requirements because they invest standardless and unre-
strained discretion in the hands of the government agents who make
decisions about who to target for surveillance. 294 The Court carefully
reviewed inspection protocols in Skinner v. Railway Executives Ass 'n,
2 9 5
and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab296 to ensure that
inspections were done randomly, or that all persons were tested, and that
officials had no discretion about how to administer the tests.297 In Dela-
ware v. Prouse, the Court invalidated automobile stops where the
officers had "standardless and unconstrained discretion. 298
The searches contemplated by the 2007 FISA amendments are sub-
ject to no guidelines or standards other than that the subject of surveil-
lance is reasonably believed to be outside the United States and in
possession of foreign-intelligence information. Unlike the original FISA
provisions, the 2007 amendments do not limit surveillance to those who
are an "agent of a foreign power. ' 299 That provision in the original ver-
sion of FISA had limited the subjects of surveillance, as noted by the
Foreign Intelligence Court of Review:
Under the definition of "agent of a foreign power" FISA surveillance
could not be authorized against an American reporter merely because
he gathers information for publication in a newspaper, even if the
information was classified by the Government. Nor would it be
authorized against a Government employee or former employee who
reveals secrets to a reporter or in a book for the purpose of informing
293. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(e)(2) (Lexis 2007).
294. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711-12 (1987) (upholding warrantless searches in
automobile junkyard because administrative-inspection program limited discretion of officers).
295. 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989).
296. 489 U.S. 656, 6687, 672 n.2 (1989).
297. See Gould & Stem, supra note 273, at 818-19.
298. Id. 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 49
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Roadblock seizures are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if they are 'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
the conduct of individual officers."' (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
299. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2000).
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the American people. This definition would not authorize surveil-
lance of ethnic Americans who lawfully gather political information
and perhaps even lawfully share it with the foreign government of
their national origin. It obviously would not apply to lawful activities
to lobby, influence, or inform Members of Congress or the adminis-
tration to take certain positions with respect to foreign or domestic
concerns. Nor would it apply to lawful gathering of information pre-
paratory to such lawful activities.
• ..As should be clear from the foregoing, FISA applies only to
certain carefully delineated, and particularly serious, foreign threats
to national security.
3 °°
Under the amendments, the persons described in the previous paragraph
could become the subject of surveillance. The amendments do not limit
warrantless surveillance to "carefully delineated, and particularly seri-
ous, foreign threats to national security."' 0 '
In the absence of review of proposed searches by an impartial judi-
cial officer, limitations on the discretion of the authorizing law-enforce-
ment agents are crucial. The failure to include any meaningful
limitations in the 2007 FISA amendments is fatal to any argument that
warrantless searches under the amendments can be justified under the
special-needs exception.
VII. CONCLUSION
Over the course of American history, Presidents have periodically
asserted the right to take unilateral action based on claims that national
security demanded it, and have overreached in doing so, violating basic
constitutional rights. History has always rendered a judgment that a ter-
rible mistake was made. We have learned that executive overreaching
often has posed a risk as great or greater to our democratic way of life
than the dangers such officials warned against.
The TSP and the 2007 amendments to FISA raise fundamental
questions about the implied powers of the President and the powers of
the government in general to conduct warrantless electronic surveil-
lance. This article has made the argument that the President's actions
with respect to warrantless electronic surveillance are illegal and uncon-
stitutional. The government has argued that the judicial branch is pre-
cluded from entertaining those questions because of the state-secrets
privilege. The government's argument would render even blatant con-
stitutional violations immune from judicial inquiry once an executive
300. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 739 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
301. Id.
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official announces that, in his opinion, disclosures necessary to the liti-
gation of a case would somehow harm national security.
That argument is fundamentally incompatible with the structure of
American democracy. Our divided system of government can only
function when the courts are willing to hold the Executive to account for
breaking the law. The permanent damage that would be caused by the
abject abandonment of our constitutional system of checks and balances
and separation of powers is incalculably greater than any temporal dan-
ger that might be presumed to exist to our national security from exter-
nal enemies.
Two extraordinary cases demonstrate the need for judicial scrutiny
of executive overreaching despite asserted national-security concerns.
In Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the wholesale
transportation and internment in camps of the Japanese American popu-
lation on the West Coast because it concluded it could not "reject as
unfounded" the conclusion of the military authorities that there was the
"gravest imminent danger to the public safety. 3° z Forty years later,
both congressional and judicial authorities documented that the Depart-
ment of Justice had been in possession of information contradicting
General DeWitt's report, on which the Supreme Court relied, and that
the government's brief in the Supreme Court had been redrafted twice to
keep that fact from the Court.3°3 The commission established by Con-
gress to study the matter concluded that the detention of the Japanese
Americans was caused not by military necessity, but by "race prejudice,
war hysteria and a failure of political leadership. ' '3° Korematsu occu-
pies some of the most shameful pages in the United States Reports.
At the other end of the spectrum of judicial review lies the Penta-
gon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United States. 305 The govern-
ment claimed that national security required an order forbidding the New
York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified study
concerning the Vietnam War already in their possession. The Supreme
Court rejected the argument and the papers were published, with no
adverse consequences to national security.30 6 Cases such as these
should leave us all skeptical of the broad claims of secrecy the Executive
makes under the banner of national security in the shadow of September
11.
302. 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
303. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1416-17 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
304. Id. at 1417.
305. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
306. The Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, who argued for secrecy, later admitted that he had
opposed publication although he had perceived no threat to national security. Erwin N. Griswold,
Secrets Not Worth Keeping, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
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